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Introduction
No man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.1
In at least one case, a parody exception to the common law right
of publicity has been and probably again will be adapted from federal
copyright law's easily analogous four-factor, fair use exception.' The
first factor of the fair use exception is "the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes."3 If and when this factor is applied in
the right of publicity context, it should not distinguish lazily and pe-
remptorily between impermissible parodies in advertisements and
permissible ones in other forms of commercial speech, as in the one
case4 to date creating a parody exception in emulation of fair use. Pa-
rodic advertising should be accorded as much First Amendment 5 pro-
tection in the face of common law right of publicity claims as that
given to parodies in other types of commercial speech. If there's go-
ing to be a parody exception to the right of publicity, in other words, it
should be permissible, at least given certain other circumstances, to
parody a celebrity in an advertisement and in other forms of commer-
cial speech without having to pay to do so.
Section I of this Article briefly examines: 1) the reasoning in the
Ninth Circuit's 1992 opinions in White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc. and some of the early (and overwhelmingly unfavora-
ble) legal commentary in reaction to those opinions;6 and 2) the initial
reasoning in one case the following year in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, Cardtoons v. Major
League Baseball Players Association, that also considered creating a
parody exception to the right of publicity.7 The White court refused to
1. 3 BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed. 1934) (quoted in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1993)). Neither of the authors, interestingly enough, has
received any direct or indirect remuneration whatsoever for writing this Article.
Accord Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 135 (1993). "They're talking dollars. As Jack Benny
would say, dollars." Id. (quoting New York State Senator Emanuel Gold (citing Hearing to
Discuss the Celebrity Rights Act Before the N.Y. State Senate 8 (Feb. 25, 1988) (Upstate
Reporting Serv.))).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
3. Id. § 107(1).
4. Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868 F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Okla.
1994). See infra part III.
5. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993). See infra part I.A.
7. 838 F. Supp. 1501 (N.D. Okla. 1993) (holding plaintiffs not entitled to preliminary
injunction). See infra part I.B.
1995]
create any parody exception-vindicating plaintiff Vanna White's
right of publicity in the face of a parody in a Samsung Electronics
television advertisement for a product totally unrelated to White.8 In-
itially, Cardtoons also refused to create a similar parody exception-
vindicating the baseball players' rights of publicity in the face of trad-
ing cards parodying them.9 However, almost all of the early legal
commentary on White called for the Ninth Circuit to create a parody
exception of some scope, most urging an explicit emulation of copy-
right's fair use exception.
Section II considers the current jurisprudential status of First
Amendment parody defenses and the fair use exception's first factor
in the wake of United States Supreme Court Associate Justice David
H. Souter's application of the exception in his 1993 Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose opinion.1" Justice Souter accepted such a defense made by a rap
group to a copyright infringement claim by both the owners of the
copyright and the original performer of the parodied song.
Section III considers the status of such defenses to a common law
right of publicity claim as exemplified by the reasoning of Chief Dis-
trict Court Judge James 0. Ellison's 1994 reconsideration, necessary in
Campbell's wake, of his earlier adoption of the Magistrate Judge's Re-
port and Recommendation in Cardtoons," including his newly revised
and updated interpretation of White.1 2 The Cardtoons reconsidera-
tion-an appeal of which was filed on January 18, 1995, and is cur-
rently pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuitl 3-created a parody exception to the right of publicity.
However, the decision also included a hesitant distinction between
those impermissible parodies in advertisements, as in White, and those
permissible parodies in other forms of commercial speech.
Section IV considers the jurisprudential status of the distinction
between advertising and other types of commercial speech. This dis-
tinction is exemplified by the reasoning of United States District
Court Judge Zita L. Weinshienk in two cases involving the Adolph
Coors Company and by extended obiter dicta in Associate Justice
John Paul Stevens' subsequent opinion for the Court in the 1993 case
of City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 4 Judge Weinshienk's
8. White, 971 F.2d at 1399, 1402.
9. Cardtoons, 838 F. Supp. at 1504.
10. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1993). See infra part II.
11. 868 F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Okla. 1994). See infra part III.A.
12. See infra part III.B.
13. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Cardtoons, No. 95-5006 (10th Cir. filed
Jan. 18, 1995).
14. 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1511-13 (1993). See infra part IV.B.
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first opinion in Adolph Coors Co. v. Baker held that the government's
asserted interest in restricting content allowable in both advertising
for an alcoholic product and product labeling was neither strong
enough, nor directly advanced by the statutory provisions at issue to
overcome Coors' First Amendment rights.' 5 Thus, neither restriction
was constitutionally permissible.' 6 Judge Weinshienk's second opin-
ion in Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady held that the government's interest
in restricting content allowable in advertising was constitutionally
strong enough to overcome Coors' commercial speech rights. 7 How-
ever, while the government's interest in restricting the content of the
other form of commercial speech-labeling-was strong enough, that
interest was not directly advanced by the provision at issue and thus
unconstitutional. 18 Coors did not appeal the advertising restriction. 19
Similar to the first district court opinion in Coors, dicta of Justice
Stevens' in the Discovery opinion would have held that the govern-
ment's asserted interest in restricting the distribution of both publica-
tions composed in large part of advertising and newspapers (sold for
profit) would have been neither strong enough, nor directly or reason-
ably advanced enough by the municipal code provisions at issue to be
constitutional. In other words, the amount of First Amendment pro-
tection afforded to commercial speech in the form of advertising
would have resulted in the same outcome as for that afforded any
other form of commercial speech. This Section concludes with appli-
cations of the Discovery dicta to the facts of a theoretically appealed
Coors,2" to those facts of the actually appealed Cardtoons reconsidera-
tion with its parody exception,21 and to White with a theoretical par-
ody exception.22
15. Reporter's Transcript at 46-59, Adolph Coors Co. v. Baker (D. Colo. May 31,
1989) (No. 87-2-977), rev'd and remanded, Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543 (10th
Cir. 1991), cert. granted, Bentsen v. Adolph Coors Co., 114 S. Ct. 2671 (June 13, 1994) (No.
93-1631) [hereinafter Reporter's Transcript, Baker]. See also infra part IV.A.1.
16. Reporter's Transcript, Baker, supra note 15, at 55.
17. Reporter's Transcript at 1-13, Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady (D. Colo. Oct. 28, 1992)
(No. 87-2-977), affd, Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993), cert.
granted, Bentsen v. Adolph Coors Co., 114 S. Ct. 2671 (June 13, 1994) (No. 93-1631).
[hereinafter Reporter's Transcript, Brady] See also infra part IV.A.2.
18. Reporter's Transcript, Brady, supra note 17, at 4-5, 9.
19. See Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993).
20. See infra part IV.C.1.
21. See infra part IV.C.2.
22. See infra part IV.C.3.
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The Jurisprudential Status of Parody Defenses to
Common Law Right of Publicity Claims
A. The Ninth Circuit's Reasoning in White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc.-Glitz
1. White
On the well-known and highly successful syndicated game show
Wheel of Fortune, with which most television-generation Americans
worthy of the name are familiar, three usually bubbly contestants
guess-at consonant-by-consonant, 23 purchased-vowel-by-purchased-
vowel24 intervals-which (supposedly) commonly used linguistic phrase
is hidden behind a large, on-stage panel of initially unilluminated boxes.
After a contestant correctly guesses a consonant or purchases a vowel
that is in the phrase at least once, beautiful and always fashionably at-
tired co-host 25 Vanna White26 gracefully walks across the stage and
turns each now-illuminated box with that particular consonant or vowel.
That is glitz. The contestant to first guess the entire phrase on the basis
of whatever letters are showing wins money and prizes; the one with the
most money after several rounds gets to participate in an often highly
climactic final round for even more money or a bigger prize.27
In the early 1990s, Samsung Electronics created and "ran" promo-
tional television advertisements for its video-cassette recorders featur-
ing a robot with a wig, wearing a gown and jewelry, standing atop a
stage in front of a large panel of boxes unmistakably like that of Wheel
of Fortune's.28 A caption beneath this mechanical parody of White,
meant to highlight how long Samsung's recorders would last, read:
23. The five most commonly chosen consonants, of course, are: R, S, T, L, and N.
24. Contestants purchase vowels by paying a relatively modest (given their obvious
importance in this context), one-time, ex ante charge of $250 per vowel. In other words,
you pay $250 whether Vanna turns over one, three, six, or however many As, Es, Is, Os, or
Us.
25. The show's other nighttime co-host is Pat Sajak.
26. According to one decidedly non-legal commentator, Vanna White is "a sweet
thing. She's a harbinger of the re-emergence of traditional feminine behavior. She's mute,
obliging and servile. She's also busty, which is important." Gretchen A. Pemberton, The
Parodist's Claim to Fame: A Parody Exception to the Right of Publicity, 27 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 97, 120 n.84 (1993) (quoting Dan Hurley, Of Fame and Vanna White: The End of
Celebrity, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Dec. 1988, at 50). Her "lack of real achievement is a symbol
of the emptiness of our culture." Id. (quoting Hurley, supra, at 53). "[l]n the modern age,
there could hardly be a more important symbolic figure." Id. (quoting Jib Fowles, The
Truth About Vanna, 23:3 TELEVISION Q. 69, 71 (1988)).
27. Sound like a glitzy, mass-media version of a simple, pencil (if not crayon)-and-
paper, childhood game: "Hangman?"
28. See infra Appendix A (Vanna White, Samsung's Robot, and Other Samsung Ad-
vertisements). See also Barbara M. Lange, Shopping for the California Right of Publicity,
16 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 151, 177 (1993).
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"Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D. ' '29 White-"[p]erhaps failing
to see the humor" 30-sued Samsung (and the advertising agency that
prepared and produced the ads, David Deutsch Associates, Inc.) in fed-
eral district court.31 She alleged, inter alia, that the use of her image and
likeness in this way infringed her common law right of publicity.3 2 Sam-
[N]o one looking at the Samsung robot could believe it was Vanna White. The
robot's 'features,' excepting the wig and the gown, were mechanical and did not
bear the exacting resemblance required to support a 'likeness' action .... [I]t is
unlikely a juror could reasonably understand the robot to actually be any person,
much less White.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
29. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g de-
nied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993). See also Appendix A.
Other Samsung advertisements had the same purpose. One, for example, featured a raw
steak under which a caption read, "Revealed to be health food. 2010 A.D." Id. Another
depicted then-television talk-show host Morton Downey, Jr., in front of an American flag,
under whom a caption read, "Presidential candidate. 2008 A.D." Id. "I had never heard
of Morton Downey, Jr., but I'm told he's sort of like Rush Limbaugh, but not as shy."
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 n.12 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
30. White, 989 F.2d at 1514 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
"I don't know why this has happened to me," White said. "I work hard and I'm dedicated,
but overall I'm totally surprised. What did I do to deserve this?" Madow, supra note 1, at
127 (citing Hurley, supra note 26, at 55 (quoting Vanna White)),
"[E]verything," of course, "is funny as long as it is happening to somebody Else, but
when it happens to you, why it seems to lose some of its Humor." Tammi A. Gauthier, Fun
& Profit: When Commercial Parodies Constitute Copyright or Trademark Infringement, 21
PEPP. L. REV. 165, 165 (1993) (quoting Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482,
1486 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting WILL ROGERS, THE WRITINGS OF WILL ROGERS 75
(1974))).
31. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989
F.2d 1512 (1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
32. Id. at 1397. The right of publicity exists under the common law of 15 states-
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. Among these, four have
statutes encompassing the right-California, Florida, Texas, and Wisconsin. Nine other
states have statutes including most aspects of the right-Kentucky, Massachusetts, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia. John F.
Hyland & Ted C. Lindquist III, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.: The Wheels
of Justice Take an Unfortunate Turn, 23 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 299, 304 n.38 (1993) (citing
2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 28.04[1] (3d ed. 1992)).
A right of publicity claim, under California common law, must include allegations of:
"(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name
or likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and
(4) resulting injury." White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (quoting Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198
Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (1983)).
"Just thirty-five years ago, no one had ever heard of the right of publicity. Today, it is
a dynamic new area of litigation that grows and changes with each new case." Steven T.
Margoling, Note, From Imitation to Litigation: Expanded Protection for Commercial Prop-
erty Rights in Identity, 96 DICK. L. REv. 491, 491 (1992). It "is really a creature born of
modern mass media." Russell A. Stamets, Ain't Nothin' Like the Real Thing, Baby: The
Right of Publicity and the Singing Voice, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 347, 351 (1994) (citation
1995]
omitted). Closely related to the right of privacy but assignable to a third party in the
manner of a property right, it was first recognized by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in 1953's Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Significantly, Haelan noted the value of a celebrity's image.
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in
New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture,
and that such a grant may validly be made "in gross," Le., without an accompany-
ing transfer of a business or of anything else ....
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is common knowledge
that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having
their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel
sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances .... This right of publicity would usually yield
them no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.
Id. at 868. Since Haelan, the right of publicity has been recognized in most states either by
common law or, in 12 states, by statute. Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 838 F. Supp. 1501, 1511 n.14 (N.D. Okla. 1993).
In the wake of Haelan, the then-new right of publicity was quickly and thoroughly
fleshed out in an important article by Paramount Pictures Corporation attorney Melville B.
Nimmer. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203
(1954). Nimmer argued (ultimately successfully) that to fully protect an individual's right
of publicity, it must necessarily be considered a property right.
The nature of the inadequacy of the traditional legal theories dictates in large
measure the substance of the right of publicity. The right of publicity must be
recognized as a property (not a personal) right, and as such capable of assignment
and subsequent enforcement by the assignee. Furthermore, appropriation of
publicity values should be actionable regardless of whether the defendant has
used the publicity in a manner offensive to the sensibilities of the plaintiff ....
There must be no waiver of the right by reason of the plaintiff being a well known
personality. Indeed, the right usually becomes important only when the plaintiff
(or potential plaintiff) has achieved in some degree a celebrated status.
Id. at 216. "[E]very person is entitled to the fruit of his labors," according to Nimmer,
especially those "who have long and laboriously nurtured the fruit of publicity values." Id.
However, "while the right of publicity has grown to become an independent right, it still
remains closely related to the right of privacy." Contra Hyland & Lindquist, supra, at 333
(footnotes omitted). "Fame, after all, is 'no sure test of merit."' Madow, supra note 1, at
179 (citation omitted). "For example, the right to publicity doctrine recognizes that a ce-
lebrity's persona is his or her product, so that taking a celebrity's persona and using it for
commercial gain is little different from stealing a manufacturer's product and selling it."
See American Economy Ins. Co. v. Reboans, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 875, 880 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(citations omitted). "Right to publicity laws also protect the intrusion into one's privacy
that comes from having one's identity used in a manner with which one disagrees." But see
id. (citing Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992)). "[Iln the concept of 'right of
privacy' there is implicit the right of property, at least in the instance of an appropriation
by defendant of another's likeness... insofar as plaintiffs' claim is based on the appropria-
tion of their likeness and name for defendant's commercial benefit, it is an action for inva-
sion of their 'property' rights and not one for 'injury to the person."' See also Estate of
Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1354 (1981) (D.N.J. 1981) (quoting Canessa v. Kislak,
Inc., 235 A.2d 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967)); Howard I. Berkman, The Right of
Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOK. L. REV. 527, 557
(1976).
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sung defended its parodic use of the robot in its advertisement, inter
alia, on First Amendment grounds. 33
The right of publicity should be fully recognized as a common law property
right. In its essential nature, it differs from the right of privacy in that it protects a
pecuniary and not a personal interest. The differences that exist between the two
rights must be acknowledged, and, unless limited by legislation, the right of pub-
licity should be viewed as a property right... in the same manner as any other
property right. In order to provide adequate redress for those wronged, the com-
mon law must be ever-expanding. In this modern age of sophisticated advertis-
ing, recognition of the right of publicity is an essential means of protecting public
figures from those who would wrongfully appropriate the pecuniary fruits of
fame.
Id.
"This could be called a 'natural rights' rationale in that it starts with the premise that
what I create and that which identities me is mine, unless there is some strong public policy
to the contrary." J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIrHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 2-8
(1993). See Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL. W. L.
REV. 187, 200 (1992).
[T]hese property rights in names and likenesses are restricted to commercial ex-
ploitation, which again reveals the qualified character of the property right. It is
not as though no person is allowed to mention or to criticize, or report on, the
affairs of another individual without his consent. Gossip about public figures is
done without leave. Book reviewers do not have to obtain permission of the au-
thor before they damn or praise his work, and politicians, entertainers and others
who choose to enter the public eye cannot insist on monopoly control of their
names and likeness in the ordinary press. The middle position is again based on
sensible empirical compromises. The public tends to lose if criticism and com-
mentary are stifled, but there is no corresponding public interest in allowing com-
mercial exploitation by strangers, where there is no incentive to build or tear
down reputations as the case may warrant: whatever name-value the individual
acquires or maintains, it is his to sell if he chooses.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also generally Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy,
Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1588-91, 1620-
21 (1979).
The increasingly popular dichotomy between privacy and publicity rights is a
source of confusion, because the distinction between the two simply does not
withstand analysis. In both cases, the legal right is precisely the same: it is the
right to be protected against media portrayals for exploitative purposes that cause
identifiable harm, a right that combines privacy and publicity considerations.
Id. at 1620.
"The right of publicity recently received a boost when the American Law Institute
officially released the final draft of its Restatement (3d) of Unfair Competition. For the
first time the new restatement includes a right of publicity as a free-standing adjunct to
unfair-competition law." Henry R. Kaufman & Michael K. Cantwell, Right of Publicity
Gets Support From Restatement, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 20, 1995, at C6. "With approval of a
poverty-based publicity law as one intellectual property component of the unfair-competi-
tion restatement, the right of publicity would appear-for better or worse-to have come
of age." Id.
33. White, 971 F.2d at 1401. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 32, at 1590. "The First
Amendment inevitably defines the operation and extent of the right of publicity; once the
defendant can establish that the expression in question is protected, he will almost invaria-
bly prevail." Id. (footnote omitted).
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"Samsung... argued that the court should adopt a parody excep-
tion to the right of publicity and cited two other intellectual property
cases dealing with parody" 34-the Supreme Court's opinion in Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwel 35 and the First Circuit's opinion in L.L.
Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.36 Hustler involved an unsuccessful
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against a Hustler
magazine parody, in the form of a liquor advertisement, of the Rever-
end Jerry Falwell, then leader of the Moral Majority.37 While Falwell
argued "that a different standard should apply in this case because
here the State seeks to prevent not reputational damage, but the se-
vere emotional distress suffered by the person who is the subject of an
offensive publication, 38 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's opinion
for the Court concluded
that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publica-
tions such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that
the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made
with 'actual malice,' i.e., with knowledge that the statement was
false or with reckless disregard as to whether it was true or not
true.39
34. Pemberton, supra note 26, at 126.
35. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
36. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
37. 485 U.S. at 47-48. Specifically,
[t]he inside front cover of the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured
a "parody" of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur that contained the name
and picture of respondent and was entitled "Jerry Falwell talks about his first
time." This parody was modeled after actual Campari ads that included inter-
views with various celebrities about their "first times." Although it was apparent
by the end of each interview that this meant the first time they sampled Campari,
the ads clearly played on the sexual double entendre of the general subject of
"first times." Copying the form and layout of these Campari ads, Hustler's edi-
tors chose respondent as the featured celebrity and drafted an alleged "interview"
with him in which he states that his "first time" was during a drunken incestuous
rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. The Hustler parody portrays respon-
dent and his mother as drunk and immoral, and suggests that respondent is a
hypocrite who preaches only when he is drunk. In small print at the bottom of
the page, the ad contains the disclaimer, "ad parody-not to be taken seriously."
The magazine's table of contents also lists the ad as "Fiction; Ad and Personality
Parody."
Id. at 48 (footnote omitted). "While the case was pending, the ad parody was published in
Hustler magazine a second time." Id. at 49 n-1.
38. Id. at 52. Cf Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
(ruling that the 'actual malice' standard does not apply to the tort of misappropriation of a
right of publicity).
39. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56. "This is not merely a 'blind application' of the New York
Times standard, it reflects our considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to
give adequate 'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." Id.
(citation omitted).
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L.L. Bean involved a trademark-dilution claim (also unsuccessful)
against a parody of an entire L.L. Bean catalog.40 According to Cir-
cuit Judge Hugh H. Bownes' opinion, "We think the Constitution tol-
erates an incidental impact on rights of expression of commercial
actors in order to prevent a defendant from unauthorizedly merchan-
dising his products with another's trademark,"'4 1 but "[t]he Constitu-
tion does not, however, permit the range of the anti-dilution statute to
encompass the unauthorized use of a trademark in a noncommercial
setting such as an editorial or artistic context. '42 Here, too, the de-
fendant's First Amendment, free speech, parody defense overcame
the asserted right of an aggrieved, parodied plaintiff.
In White District Court Judge Ronald S. W. Lew granted all of
Samsung's summary judgment motions, including that regarding its
First Amendment, free speech, parody defense.4  The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded-
but preserved White's common law claim of a violation of her right of
publicity, refusing to recognize a parody exception to the common law
40. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 27. Specifically, the October 1984 issue of High Society
magazine-"a monthly periodical featuring adult erotic entertainment," owned by Drake
Publishers,
contained a two-page article entitled "L.L. Beam's Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog."
(Emphasis added). The article was labelled on the magazine's contents page as
"humor" and "parody." The article displayed a facsimile of Bean's trademark
and featured pictures of nude models in sexually explicit positions using "prod-
ucts" that were described in a crudely humorous fashion.
Id.
Also, according to the relevant anti-dilution statute (Maine's), "[Ilikelihood of injury
to business reputation or of dilution of a mark registered under this chapter ... shall be
ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the par-
ties or the absence of confusion as to the source of the goods or services." Id. at 27 n.l.
41. Id. at 32.
In such circumstances, application of the anti-dilution statute constitutes a legiti-
mate regulation of commercial speech, which the Supreme Court has defined as
"expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audi-
ence." It offends the Constitution, however, to invoke the anti-dilution statute as
a basis for enjoining the noncommercial use of a trademark by a defendant en-
gaged in a protected form of expression.
Id. (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 33.
If the anti-dilution statute were construed as permitting a trademark owner
to enjoin the use of his mark in a noncommercial context found to be negative or
offensive, then a corporation could shield itself from criticism by forbidding the
use of its name in commentaries critical of its conduct. The legitimate aim of the
anti-dilution statute is to prohibit the unauthorized use of another's trademark in
order to market incompatible products or services.
Id.
43. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g
denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
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right of publicity." Hustler and L.L. Bean, according to the court of
appeals' opinion by Senior Circuit Judge Alfred T. Goodwin,
involved parodies of advertisements run for the purpose of poking
fun at Jerry Falwell and L.L. Bean, respectively. This case involves
a true advertisement run for the purpose of selling Samsung VCRs.
The ad's spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune is subservient
and only tangentially related to the ad's primary message: "buy
Samsung VCRs." Defendants' parody arguments are better ad-
dressed to non-commercial parodies. The difference between a
"parody" and a "knock-off" is the difference between fun andprofi t.45
In a strong partial dissent, Circuit Judge Arthur L. Alarcon
thought the decision gave "short shrift" to Samsung's First Amend-
ment defense.
The majority's attempt to distinguish this case from Hustler...
and L.L. Bean ... is unpersuasive. The majority notes that the par-
odies in those cases were made for the purpose of poking fun at the
Reverend Jerry Falwell and L.L. Bean. But the majority fails to
consider that the defendants in those cases were making fun of the
Reverend Jerry Falwell and L.L. Bean for the purely commercial
purpose of selling soft-core pornographic magazines.
Generally, a parody does not constitute an infringement on the
original work if it takes no more than is necessary to "conjure up"
the original. The majority has failed to consider these factors prop-
erly in deciding that Vanna White may bring an action for damages
solely because the popularity of the fame [sic] show, Wheel of
Fortune.
44. Id. at 1397-99. See Hyland & Lindquist, supra note 32, at 334-35.
Vanna White sought damages entirely for the unauthorized use of her prop-
erty; i.e. the endorsement value of her celebrity identity. Therefore, in order to
prevail she should be required to show that Samsung did in fact use her property.
Her endorsement was not implicit because she was not present in the advertise-
ment. The advertisement simply featured a robot styled to resemble her.
Id. See also Lange, supra note 28, at 167. "Although many Ninth Circuit holdings comport
with California precedents, recent decisions such as ... White, which emphasize a celeb-
rity's 'property' interest in her 'identity,' go beyond and even contradict California law as
interpreted by California courts." Id. (footnotes omitted). "[Ajllowing White to proceed
... rewards White merely for being famous, not for her creative efforts .... The robot...
was only identifiable from the Wheel of Fortune set." Id. at 179 (footnotes omitted).
45. White, 971 F.2d at 1401 (footnote omitted). In affirming the denial of a summary
judgment against Wood Johnson, who sued television producers Harry Thomason and
Linda Bloodworth-Thomason for the improper use of his name for a character played by
Burt Reynolds in the television series "Evening Shade," the Ninth Circuit's Judge Harry
Pregerson-one of the three judges on the panel that heard the White case-has subse-
quently written that "California courts have liberally defined commercial purpose to in-
clude more than traditional, direct advertising . . . . Nonetheless, commercial purpose
means more than merely using a person's name as part of a cast of characters in a televi-
sion program advertisement that highlights the program's general plot." Newton v. Thom-
ason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
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The effect of the majority's holding on expressive conduct is
difficult to estimate. The majority's position seems to allow any fa-
mous person or entity to bring suit based on any commercial adver-
tisement that depicts a character or role performed by the plaintiff.
Under the majority's view of the law, Gene Autry could have
brought an action for damages against all other singing cowboys.
Clint Eastwood would be able to sue anyone who plays a tall, soft-
spoken cowboy, unless, of course, Jimmy Stewart had not previ-
ously enjoined Clint Eastwood. Johnny Weismuller would have
been able to sue each actor who played the role of Tarzan. Sylves-
ter Stallone could sue actors who play blue-collar boxers. Chuck
Norris could sue all karate experts who display their skills in motion
pictures. Arnold Schwarzenegger could sue body builders who are
compensated for appearing in public.4 6
Judge Alarcon's dissent, however, according to Senior Judge
Goodwin's majority opinion,
reads this decision too broadly. This case concerns only the market
which exists in our society for the exploitation of celebrity to sell
products, and an attempt to take a free ride on a celebrity's celeb-
rity value. Commercial advertising which relies on celebrity fame is
different from other forms of expressive activity in two crucial ways.
First, for celebrity exploitation advertising to be effective, the
advertisement must evoke the celebrity's identity. The more effec-
tive the evocation, the better the advertisement. If, as Samsung
claims, its ad was based on a "generic" game-show hostess and not
on Vanna White, the ad would not have violated anyone's right of
publicity, but it would also not have been as humorous or as
effective.
Second, even if some forms of expressive activity, such as par-
ody, do rely on identity evocation, the First Amendment hurdle will
bar most right of publicity actions against those activities. In the
case of commercial advertising, however, the First Amendment hur-
dle is not so high. Realizing this, Samsung attempts to elevate its ad
above the status of garden-variety commercial speech by pointing to
the ad's parody of Vanna White. Samsung's argument is unavailing.
Unless the First Amendment bars all right of publicity actions-and
it does not-then it does not bar this case.47
Samsung's petition for rehearing was denied and a suggested re-
hearing en banc failed to receive a majority of votes. 8 Circuit Judge
Alex Kozinski, joined by two others, filed an even stronger (and
broader) dissent to this denial.
Private property, including intellectual property, is essential to
our way of life. It provides an incentive for investment and innova-
tion; it stimulates the flourishing of our culture; it protects the moral
entitlements of people to the fruits of their labors. But reducing too
much to private property can be bad medicine. Private land, for
46. White, 971 F.2d at 1407 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 1401 n.3 (citations omitted).
48. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
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instance, is far more useful if separated from other private land by
public streets, roads and highways. Public parks, utility rights-of-
way and sewers reduce the amount of land in private hands, but
vastly enhance the value of the property that remains.
So too it is with intellectual property. Overprotecting intellec-
tual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is im-
possible without a rich public domain. Nothing today, likely
nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science
and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on
the works of those who came before. Overprotection stifles the
very creative forces it's supposed to nurture.
The panel's opinion is a classic case of overprotection. Con-
cerned about what it sees as a wrong done to Vanna White, the
panel majority erects a property right of remarkable and dangerous
breadth: Under the majority's opinion, it's now a tort for advertis-• • 49
ers to remind the public of a celebrity.
Samsung5° filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the
Supreme Court denied 51-"quite possibly for prematurity. The Court
has a policy[52] against taking cases before they have gone to trial and
produced a 'final judgment."' 53 In January 1994 White won a jury ver-
dict of $403,000. 54 Samsung settled, agreeing to pay the full $403,000
verdict plus approximately $9,000 in costs and not to appeal in return
for White also agreeing to neither appeal nor seek a new trial (nor the
49. Id. at 1513-14 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (footnote
omitted). According to the dissent, the White majority opinion
raises serious First Amendment problems. It's bad law, and it deserves a long,
hard second look.
Intellectual property rights aren't like some constitutional rights, absolute
guarantees protected against all kinds of interference, subtle as well as blatant.
They cast no penumbras, emit no emanations: The very point of intellectual
property laws is that they protect only against certain specific kinds of appropria-
tion ....
The majority ... [is] creating a new and much broader property right.
Id. at 1514, 1515.
50. Represented by Amy Hogue of Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro in Los Angeles. Ste-
phen R. Barnett, The Big Chill: Free Speech in Advertising, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 19, 1994,
at 21.
51. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
52. "[N]ot addressed in Pillsbury's perfunctory 10 page cert petition." Barnett, The
Big Chill, supra note 50, at 23.
53. Id.
54. Id.
Although this was much less than the millions she had sought, one expected Sam-
sung and Deutsch (and their insurer) to shoot again for the Supreme Court. Now
that they had a final judgment their chance was much greater, and as legal fees go
it would not cost much-just the cost of a brief for the 9th Circuit and then the
cert petition.
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attorney fees the trial judge denied her). 5 "The Supreme Court thus
got no chance to take the Vanna White case when it might have, after
the judgment was final."56
No blockhead she.
2. In the Whites of Their Eyes: Early Legal Commentary
According to one commentator, "As the majority and dissenting
opinions in White show, courts and commentators differ materially on
how far the right of publicity should extend. Even without consider-
ing the extensive First Amendment concerns, the line between what
should and should not be actionable is difficult to draw."57 Indeed,
according to a second, though pre-White, commentator,
there has yet to emerge a satisfactory test specific enough to strike
an appropriate balance, while still allowing celebrity interests and
commercial users the requisite certainty needed to act with confi-
dence and dispatch in the volatile, rapid-fire world of celebrity
rights exploitation ....
The problem of adequately and fairly defining the limits of the
right of publicity is not a new one.58
"The Vanna White decision seems to create a new cause of action
against those who parody celebrities," according to the analysis of a
third commentator,59 this one willing to go ahead and actually "con-
55. Id.
It's true a new trial might have produced a much bigger verdict, and one can
understand the insurer's feeling that the result could have been a lot worse. But
the chance of a new trial's being granted-assuming White would actually have
asked for one-was slight. And meanwhile the important free speech claims the
case presented (on uniquely compelling facts), and the real chance of having them
heard by the Supreme Court, were lightly bargained away.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Lange, supra note 28, at 185 (footnote omitted). This commentator's (more-nar-
row) conclusion: "[Tihe California right of publicity is neither as narrow as the district
court in White suggested nor as broad as the Ninth Circuit held in that case." Id. at 187
(footnotes omitted).
58. H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Commercial Exploitation of Identity: A New Age for
the Right of Publicity, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 1, 28 (1992). See Stephen R. Barnett,
In Hollywood's Wheel of Fortune, Free Speech Loses a Turn, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1992, at
A12.
When does an ad "appropriate" a celebrity's "identity"? Can an ad legally
spoof a star who combines steamy sex with religious symbols? Or one who wears
only one glove? Or one who foresakes his New York Jewish anxieties to act out
his most brazen film fantasies?
The answer should be "yes," since these are totems of our popular culture.
For the Ninth Circuit, and hence for national advertising, the answer appears to
be "no."
Id.
59. Pemberton, supra note 26, at 99.
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sider the extensive First Amendment concerns."6 "Because celebri-
ties are public figures and as such have great influence and symbolic
meaning to us," this commentator concluded, "permitting parodies of
celebrities would be consistent with First Amendment values."'" The
question regarding the scope of such an exception would then become
whether such parodies should be protected even when they are por-
trayed in a commercial context.
The Hustler and L.L. Bean parodies, like Samsung's parody of
Vanna White, related to the commercial sale of a product. The Hus-
tler and L.L. Bean parodies were the actual products for sale (both
were articles in magazines for sale). While the L.L. Bean and Hus-
tler parodists created the parodies to sell them and get money, these
parodies and the White parody also had significant noncommercial
aspects. Indeed, virtually all parodies have noncommercial aspects
that warrant First Amendment protection, even if they also have
some commercial aspects. Even commercial parody usually conveys
social commentary of some type. And commercial speech is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Even advertising is entitled to First
Amendment protection.
A successful parody of a celebrity-even in advertising-would not
take away the celebrity's right or ability to sell her face or name to
endorse a product of her choosing because the public will not be-
lieve that the celebrity endorses the product. If it does, then the
parody is poor or not a parody at all, and the celebrity will have a
cause of action for false advertising or misrepresentation. Sam-
sung's parody of Vanna White is a good example. No consumer
would believe that Vanna White was endorsing Samsung videocas-
sette recorders because of Samsung's robot parody. Thus, Sam-
sung's parody cannot detract from Vanna White's ability to endorse
any product including videocassette recorders.6
2
This decision has already caused uncertainty and concern to impressionists, sati-
rists, and comedy writers. These entertainers and commentators question
whether any imitation of a celebrity could result in a lawsuit. If interpreted
broadly, the Vanna White decision might allow right of publicity claims against all
celebrity impersonators, comic impressionists, satirists, and other parodists.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See Hyland & Lindquist, supra note 32, at 325-26.
The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in its decision to remand White's common law
claim reveals a failure to recognize the significant expansion of the common law
which the court has allowed ....
The court.., has cast loose from its mooring the common law right of public-
ity and has placed upon the jury the burden of ensuring that it does not drift too
far. Moreover, the court has failed to provide any standard of guidance by which
the jury's burden may be allayed.
Id.
60. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
61. Id.
62. Pemberton, supra note 26, at 125, 127-28, 133-34 (footnotes omitted). See supra
note 28.
See also Barnett, supra note 50; Barnett, supra note 58.
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"[T]he Ninth Circuit's prohibition against the use of any element
of a celebrity's identity for advertising purposes," according to a
fourth, practitioner's similar analysis,63 "appears to be absolute even
in the absence of deception as to who is performing. This seems cer-
At stake are ads that poke fun at popular culture or politics and the celebri-
ties who people these realms ....
The White case and the judicial climate it represents are forcing advertisers,
as reported in The New York Times, "to rethink the time-honored use of satire
and parody in commercials." Adam Hanft, head of a New York ad agency, not
only told the Times that "'all the agencies and clients have become a little gun-
shy,"' but also showed how gun-shy he himself had become by removing Saddam
Hussein's photo from an ad after a protest by the Iraqi government.
Pointing one of the guns was Daryl Gates, former police chief of Los Ange-
les. When Gates was refusing to quit as chief in the wake of the Los Angeles
riots, a Chinese-food delivery service in L.A. put up a billboard with his picture
and the text: "When you can't leave the office. Or won't." Gates' lawyer de-
manded that the billboard come down, and it promptly did.
In Northern California, a dairy called Clover-Stornetta Farms long has used
billboards showing its cartoon cow, Co, in a succession of punning identities:
"Moona Lisa," "Christopher Cowlumbus," "Wolfgang Amadeus Moozart,"
among others. When Clo appeared last year diving for sunken treasure as "Jac-
ques Cowsteau," Capt. Jacques Cousteau sued, demanding $1.2 million plus prof-
its. The dairy quickly took the billboard down and settled.
Barnett, supra note 50, at 21.
Ads indeed are designed to sell products, but to do so they need to interest,
inform or entertain. So they put a high premium on creativity, and that often
entails making use of-and sometimes creating-the words and images of popu-
lar culture. Given advertising's huge volume and enormous audience, its "ex-
tracommercial" impact may exceed that of many purely noncommercial media.
This impact is seen in the frequent controversies over roles or messages and in the
way some ads achieve cult status or enter political debate ("Where's the beef?")
Under the Vanna White ruling, though, advertisers must muzzle their com-
mentary or risk being hauled before the Ninth Circuit. Television commercials
are oppressive enough, a viewer might say, without crimping their creativity.
Barnett, supra note 58. See generally HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE COR-
PORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 81-82 (1995).
Even the most blatantly commercial advertising is a form of expression of ideas
regarding choices that are just as important to most people as the selection among
political candidates. Indeed, some protected types of speech, such as pornogra-
phy, seem far less important to most people than advertising about the character-
istics of essential goods and services. Moreover, there is no clear distinction
between advertising that sells a specific product, more political advertising that is
intended to influence public opinion concerning regulation of the company's
products, and genuine political advertising concerning a candidate's philosophy
about regulatory policy.
Id. (footnote omitted).
63. William M. Borchard, The Common Law Right of Publicity is Going Wrong in the
United States: Waits v. Frito-Lay and White v. Samsung Electronics, 6 ENT. L. REv. 202,
208 (1992).
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tain to have a chilling effect on free speech in advertising. '"61 This
fourth commentator concluded that
the wisdom of this rule seems questionable. Its effect inevitably will
be to stifle creative and amusing commercials, even when no one
would be misled into thinking the celebrity was performing or mak-
ing the endorsement.
It would seem preferable to limit this right to contexts in which
there is such deception or implied endorsement. Since the public
undoubtedly would like to encourage entertaining commercials, it
would seem appropriate to decide that, in the absence of deception,
free speech interests should outweigh any harm or gain resulting
from the unauthorized use of an imitation.65
"[T]he Vanna White decision was improper in failing to recognize
a parody exception to the right of publicity tort," the third commenta-
tor similarly concluded, but only before "advocat[ing] a parody excep-
tion to the right of publicity similar to the parody exceptions to
copyright and trademark infringement."'  Indeed, according to the
second (again, pre-White) commentator, "[m]any thoughtful commen-
tators have attempted to strike an appropriate balance between public
and private interests" and their "favored theoretical vehicle for effect-
ing this compromise has been the fair use doctrine as codified by the
1976 Copyright Act."' 67 "Using, by analogy, copyright's fair use doc-
trine to ameliorate the harshness of a blanket prohibition against rea-
64. Id. at 208. See Barnett, supra note 50, at 21.
Two New York advertising lawyers, Stuart Friedel and Howard Weingrad,
told a session at the American Bar Association meeting in August how they ad-
vise their clients in the wake of White. Liability for an ad can run into the mil-
lions, noted Friedel, so regardless of possible First Amendment defenses, "in the
real world, we're going to walk away from it."
Said Weingrad: "We tell our clients that the safest course, particularly in
California, is get permission, or scrap it. You just don't know where the jury will
come out."
The Supreme Court in free speech cases often speculates about "chilling ef-
fects." Usually the Court can only speculate; it has no evidence that speakers
have in fact been chilled. Here we have such evidence. And the ads in question
could claim substantial First Amendment protection-defenses based, for exam-
ple, on the Supreme Court's test for regulation of commercial speech, a test the
White court ignored, or on analogy to the protection of parody against copyright
claims.
Id.
65. Borchard, supra note 63, at 210.
66. Pemberton, supra note 26, at 100.
67. Hetherington, supra note 58, at 28 (emphasis added). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. i (1995). "No copyright can be obtained ...on a
person's name, voice, or physical likeness." Id. "In an effort to balance the personal and
proprietary interests recognized by the right of publicity with the public interests in free
expression and in the creation of original works, some courts have engaged in an analysis
analogous to the determination of fair use in copyright law." Id. § 47 cmt. d. See also
Randall T. E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 29
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WM. & MARY L. REV. 781,816 (1988). "Parody is a fertile field for fair use litigation." Id.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
§ 107 LIMITATIONS ON EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS: FAIR USE
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is fair use the factors to be
considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
Id. See Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J.L. STUD. 67, 69 (1992).
The sense and, hence, scope of the fair use doctrine are most easily under-
stood in economic terms. A use is fair in these terms when the costs of transact-
ing with the copyright owner over permission to use the copyrighted work would
exceed the benefits of transacting. These benefits include not only... economiz-
ing on other transactions but also, and more important, stimulating the produc-
tion of intellectual property by enabling its creators to appropriate as private gain
the social value of their creation.
Id. (footnote omitted). "In cases of imitation, the public interest in competition and in
avoiding the monopolization of successful styles, together with the interest in the produc-
tion of new works including parody and satire, will ordinarily outweigh any adverse effect
on the plaintiff's market." See also' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47
cmt. d (1995) See generally WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT
LAw (1985). According to Judge Kozinski's dissent to the Ninth Circuit's denial to rehear
White,
By refusing to recognize a parody exception to the right of publicity the panel
directly contradicts the federal Copyright Act. Samsung didn't merely parody
Vanna White. It parodied Vanna White appearing in "Wheel of Fortune," a copy-
righted television show, and parodies of copyrighted works are governed by fed-
eral copyright law.
Copyright law specifically gives the world at large the right to make "fair
use" parodies, parodies that don't borrow too much of the original .... Federal
copyright law also gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to create (or li-
cense the creation of) derivative works, which include parodies that borrow too
much to qualify as "fair use."...
The majority's decision decimates this federal scheme. It's impossible to par-
ody a movie or a TV show without at the same time "evok[ing]" the "iden-
tit[ies]"of the actors. Your can't have a mock Star Wars without a mock Luke
Skywalker, Han Solo and Princess Leia, which in turn means a mock Mark Ham-
ill, Harrison Ford and Carrie Fisher. You can't have a mock Batman commercial
without a mock Batman, which means someone emulating the mannerisms of
Adam West or Michael Keaton .... The public's right to make a fair use parody
and the copyright owner's right to license a derivative work are useless if the
parodist is held hostage. by every actor whose "identity" he might need to
"appropriate."
Our court is in a unique position here. State courts are unlikely to be partic-
ularly sensitive to federal preemption, which, after all, is a matter of first concern
19951 PARODY, PARITY, AND PUBLICITY
sonable and useful appropriations of a celebrity identity has great
appeal."'  In fact, in the Supreme Court's only substantive right of
publicity case ever, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,69
Associate Justice Byron R. White's opinion applied the reasoning be-
hind the fair use exception to copyright protection, vindicating human
cannonball Hugo Zacchini's right of publicity in the face of a local
television station's broadcast of his entire act.70
to the federal courts. The Supreme Court is unlikely to consider the issue be-
cause the right of publicity seems so much a matter of state law. That leaves us.
It's our responsibility to keep the right of publicity from taking away federally
granted rights, either from the public at large or from a copyright owner. We
must make sure state law doesn't give the Vanna Whites and Adam Wests of the
world a veto over fair use parodies of the shows in which they appear, or over
copyright holders' exclusive right to license derivative works of those shows. In a
case where the copyright owner isn't even a party-where no one has the inter-
ests of copyright owners at heart-the majority creates a rule that greatly dimin-
ishes the rights of copyright holders in this circuit.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517-18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (altera-
tion in original) (citations and footnotes omitted).
68. Hetherington, supra note 58, at 28. "There are, however, two primary drawbacks
to adopting this approach to define the limits of the right of publicity." Id.
Fair use is an extremely flexible doctrine that has developed over time at common
law .... The flexibility which allows the doctrine to be a reliable legal referee in
copyright is the very component that renders it less than fully satisfactory in a
right of publicity context .... [Plredictability is a key element in the real world of
celebrity exploitation, news and entertainment. While post hoc reliance on the
four divergent prongs of fair use, which are admittedly only intended as guide-
lines, might be appropriate for courts, they are of little practical value when it
comes to calculating celebrity-related business and legal risks in a time-sensitive
environment.
The second objection stems from the differing nature of celebrities and liter-
ary property and the specific legal problems they spawn.
Id. at 28-29. Accord Coyne, supra note 67, at 817. "Using section 107 of the Copyright Act
as a model, a fair use defense can be fashioned for application to right of publicity cases."
Id. "The 'fair use' doctrine, long applied in the context of copyright law, suggests an ap-
propriate mechanism by which courts can balance the competing interests of the right of
publicity and the First Amendment." Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day
Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 191, 232 (1983).
69. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
70. Id.
This... now.., is the story of a true spectator sport ... the sport of human
cannonballing... in fact, the great Zacchini is about the only human cannonball
around, these days... just happens that, where he is, is the Great Geauga County
Fair, in Burton ... and believe me, although it's not a long act, it's a thriller...
and you really need to see it in person ... to appreciate it.
Id. at 564 n.1. The 15-second-long set of pictures accompanying this commentary on the
11-o'clock newscast of the Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.'s local television station in
Ohio on August 31, 1972, were of Zacchini shot from a cannon into a net some 200 feet
away. Id. at 563-64. While it might have been the case that the station's viewers still
needed to see Zacchini's act in person to appreciate it, they, of course, no longer needed to
see it in person-and thus pay an admission fee to the county fair at which he was perform-
ing-to see it.
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Courts still, however, "with little concrete analysis, often deny the
fair use defense where they deem the parody 'commercial" 71-a dis-
Zacchini sued, alleging that the station "'showed and commercialized the film of his
act without his consent,' and that such conduct was an 'unlawful appropriation of plaintiff's
personal property."' Id. at 564. The trial court granted Scripps-Howard's motion for sum-
mary judgment, and the court of appeals reversed. Id. Ohio's Supreme Court recognized
Zacchini's "right to the publicity value of his performance," id. at 565 (quoting Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 455 (1976)), but
nonetheless gave judgment for respondent because, in the words of the syllabus:
"A TV station has a privilege to report in its newscasts matters of legitimate pub-
lic interest which would otherwise be protected by an individual's right of public-
ity, unless the actual intent of the TV station was to appropriate the benefit of the
publicity for some non-privileged private use, or unless the actual intent was to
injure the individual."
Id. (quoting Zacchini, 351 N.E.2d at 455).
71. Beth Warnken Van Hecke, But Seriously, Folks: Toward a Coherent Standard of
Parody as Fair Use, 77 MINN. L. REV. 465, 475 (1992).
A parodist's financial motives have long played a role in determining
whether a parody is fair use. Courts, however, have been unable to define with
any consistency what constitutes a commercially-motivated parody, or what
weight they should afford commercial motives. In addition, courts often equate
"commercial" taking with bad faith, treating imaginative, socially valuable work
as chiselling for profit.
Id. at 480 (footnotes omitted). For a list of some such cases involving First Amendment,
fair use, parody defenses to copyright infringement claims, see William F. Patry & Shira
Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 667, 708 n.185 (1993).
The context of the "commercial nature" phrase as merely a subsidiary part of the
first factor indicates that the commercial or nonprofit educational element of a
given use is but one aspect of its more general purpose and character. Courts
may therefore go beyond such categorization and examine other aspects of the
purpose and character of the use-for example, whether the copyrighted material
was used for purposes of criticism or comment. While one aspect of the use's
purpose may be the purpose of the defendant's work as a whole, the focus should
be on the purpose of each specific use of the plaintiff's expression.
... [A] reading of the text itself leads to the conclusion that it does not
establish an either-or choice, with commercial uses banished to copyright purga-
tory and nonprofit educational uses admitted to the promised land privilege. Not
all uses can be classified as either "commercial" or "nonprofit educational"; some
nonprofit uses, for example, are not educational.
Few uses will qualify as purely one or the other; most involve some degree of
monetary gain, whether direct or indirect. In evaluating this aspect of the nature
of the use, some have proposed placing the commercial nature of a use on a con-
tinuum, with commerciality viewed as a matter of degree ....
At one extreme of the continuum (the most favorable for the defense) would
be uses for educational purposes in a nonprofit institution not charging any fee.
At the other extreme would be the use of a copyrighted work to promote or sell a
commercial product or service ....
In assessing the first factor balance, courts should examine the manner in
which particular material from the plaintiff's work is used. Did the defendant
reproduce the copyright owner's expression for the purpose of marketing the pre-
cise form of that expression, or for the purpose of making his own additional
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tinction also found in lower-court, non-parody, right of publicity cases,
almost always to the detriment of the commercial parodist. Accord-
ingly, as three practitioners note,
the distinction between commercial and non-commercial customa-
rily associated with right of publicity analysis may prove too restric-
tive and may inhibit political and artistic expression unduly. States
that have recognized a common law right of publicity, and legisla-
tures considering statutory rights, may want to . . . borrow the
weighing-of-interests test from the copyright fair-use defense.72
However, "the analysis of commercial vs. non-commercial provides
the greatest protection to more traditional First Amendment chan-
nels."73 Thus, they (correctly) concluded that "[o]nly a definitive reas-
sessment of right of publicity analysis seems likely to make sense of
the present self-contradictory trend. And the case that will provide a
context for it could be right around the corner.
74
statement? Other aspects of the use's "purpose and character," such as its critical
function, should not be confused with the question of its degree of commerciality.
The question of whether the use is entertainment or scholarship should be sepa-
rated from the different question of whether it brings in profit, allowing courts to
focus on the degree of social benefit fostered by that type of use.
Id. at 677-81 (footnotes omitted).
In the right of publicity context, see Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339,
1356 (D.N.J. 1981).
[T]he purpose of the portrayal in question must be examined to determine if it
predominantly serves a social function valued by the protection of free speech. If
the portrayal mainly serves the purpose of contributing information, which is not
false or defamatory, to the public debate of political or social issues or of provid-
ing the free expression of creative talent which contributes to society's cultural
enrichment, then the portrayal generally will be immune from liability. If, how-
ever, the portrayal functions primarily as a means of commercial exploitation,
then such immunity will not be granted.
Id. (citation and footnotes omitted).
72. David J. Burman, et. al., Right of Publicity Questioned, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 21, 1994,
at B9, B11-B13. "Such an approach would provide greater freedom to the more populist
forms of public comment, such as T-shirts, campaign-type buttons and bumper stickers"'
Id.
73. Id. at B13. These channels include news, magazines, and literary and dramatic
works. Id. "In that arena, fair-use analysis, with its weighing of multiple factors, is unpre-
dictable." Id.
74. Id. at B13. See Barnett, supra note 58. "It may be up to the Supreme Court to
rescue freedom of speech in advertising from the Ninth Circuit's right of publicity." Id.
Borchard, supra note 63, at 210. "[T]here may still be hope that the Ninth Circuit will pull
back, or that courts in other jurisdictions will not follow the Ninth Circuit." Id.
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B. Chief United States District Court Judge James 0. Ellison's Initial,
1993 Adoption of the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation in Cardtoons v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n-Wit
In Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Association,75 the
case that just could be the one "right around the corner,"76 Cardtoons
sought to manufacture and sell, in smaller packages, a total of 130
baseball cards parodying several active major league baseball players
and teams 7 7-including, for example, calling Baltimore Orioles' short-
stop Cal Ripken "Cal Ripkenwinkle" and the Seattle Mariners the
"Mari-Nerds. ' 78 The Ripkenwinkle card "said he once fell asleep in
the first inning and, when he awoke 20 years later, the game was still
going. So he proposed several rules to speed up play. Among them:
Players may scratch themselves only between innings. '79 That is wit.
According to Mike Sowell, author of the cards' texts, "Basically, it's
everything you see in the newspapers and on the news every day.
People have gotten so wrapped up in baseball, they've gotten too seri-
ous about it."80 The cards would include the following disclaimer:
"Cardtoons Baseball is a parody and is NOT licensed by Major
League Baseball Properties of Major League Baseball Players Associ-
ation"'" (MLBPA).
In the face of "threatened action" by the MLBPA-which had
successfully deterred subcontractor Champs Marketing, Inc., in Cleve-
75. 838 F. Supp. 1501 (N.D. Okla. 1993).
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
77. Cardtoons, 838 F. Supp. at 1506-08; Robert Fachet, Baseball Doesn't See What's So
Funny, WASH. POST, July 9, 1993, at C2.
78. By way of further example:
San Francisco Giants outfielder Barry Bonds wears an earring. The caricature of
"Treasury Bonds" also has an earring and, in fact, bears resemblance to the real
player Bonds. The same holds true for St. Louis Cardinal shortstop Ozzie Smith,
whose trademark is doing back flips when he walks on to the field. "Ozzie Myth"
is shown doing a backflip on the Cardtoons' card. Cards featuring "Fowl Boggs"
(resemblance to Wade Boggs) and "Cloud Johnson" (play on Seattle Mariners'
pitcher Randy Johnson's height of 6-foot-10) are other examples.
Cardtoons, 838 F. Supp. at 1512 n.17. "Chicago Cubs' first baseman Mark Grace is dubbed
'Amazing Grace.' San Diego outfielder Tony Gwynn is called 'Tony TWynn.' Baltimore
Orioles' shortstop Cal Ripken is named 'Cal Ripkenwinkle.' New York Yankees' first
baseman Don Mattingly is described as 'Don Battingly."' Id. at 1512 n.18. "The St. Louis
Cardinals are renamed the 'Credit Cards' and clad in the same colors as the real major
league team. The Los Angeles Dodgers are called the Codgers. The Seattle Mariners are
the 'Man-Nerds'. The Texas Rangers are the 'Strangers' and so on." Id. at 1512 n.19. See
infra Appendix B (Selected 'Cardtoons'); Fachet, supra note 77; Joe Jares, Court OKs
Firm's Plan to Make Parody Cards, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1994, at S2.
79. Fachet, supra note 77.
80. Id. (quoting Mike Sowell, author of the cards' texts).
81. Id. (emphasis in original).
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land from printing the cards by threatening such legal action 82 _
Cardtoons sought a declaratory judgment from federal district court
regarding whether the parody cards would violate the rights of public-
ity of players represented by the MLBPA.83 Chief District Court
Judge Ellison adopted the Report and Recommendation of Magis-
trate Judge Jeffrey S. Wolfe, who (properly) began his analysis by ask-
ing, "Is there a First Amendment 'parody' defense for a commercial
product under a balancing approach? Or, put simply, can one sell a
parody? No case has been found in which a First Amendment 'par-
ody' defense was successful as against a 'right to publicity' claim."'
Magistrate Judge Wolfe concluded his (adopted) analysis by find-
ing that the parody cards would in fact violate the players' rights of
publicity, codified by statute in Oklahoma,85 and refused to recognize
a parody exception to the right. "In the final analysis, the question is
82. Cardtoons, 838 F. Supp. at 1507.
83. Id. at 1504-05. See Manny Topol, At Odds Over Cards: The Unanswered Question
Is: Who Owns the Rights to the Players' Pictures?, NEWSDAY, June, 7, 1992, at 13.
Forget the escalation of bonuses and incentive clauses to bolster salaries for
professional athletes. The new gold mine for players and sports leagues is now in
the names and pictures of players on trading cards, and the money involved is
millions of dollars.
The question now is who owns the rights to a player's likeness and name-
the sports unions, the leagues, the team owners or the players? It is a battle that
is being fought in courtrooms and negotiating rooms in the four major sports
leagues.
[Tihe market for sports trading cards is huge: a $2.007-billion industry, according
to research done by Action Packed, a football card maker. Of that figure, base-
ball cards accounted for $1.299 billion, football $363 million, basketball $175 mil-
lion and hockey $170 million.
Id. See also Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Their Heroes Are on Strike, And So Are Card Collec-
tors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1995, § 1, at 1. "By rough estimate, the card industry generates
total sales for manufacturers and dealers of some $5 billion a year." Id. Bruce Horovitz,
Pro Football Players Join the Licensing Game, USA TODAY, Jan. 6, 1995, at BI.
[Tihe National Football League Players Association . . . has formed Players, a
sports-licensing corporation.
The Major League Baseball Players Association may consider doing the
same.
Players has dropped its tax-exempt status to compete with NFL Properties,
the NFL's lucrative marketing arm. That status had largely limited the group to
such passive activities as receiving royalties from trading-card companies.
Id.
84. Cardtoons, 838 F. Supp. at 1515.
85. OKLA. STAT. 12 § 1449(A) (1993).
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or
services .... without such person's prior consent.., shall be liable for any dam-
ages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof, and any profits
from the unauthorized use that are attributable to the use shall be taken into
account in computing the actual damages.
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whether Cardtoons, undeniably having created an attractive and ap-
pealing product, can claim First Amendment protection for its 'Base-
ball Parody Cards' as a 'parody.' The answer, reached under a 'use'
or, [sic] 'balancing' test, is the same."86 Applying what he called his
"use" test analysis, he found that
[i]f anything is clear in this case, the "primary purpose behind the
Defendant's parody is not an effort to make a social comment but is
an attempt to make money." Its purpose is to parody the marquee
names and likenesses of Major League Baseball in order to sell its
"trading cards." 87
And then applying his "balancing" test analysis, he found that
Cardtoons' "expression" or "speech" is commercial. The Con-
stitution "accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to
other constitutional guarantees of expression." While a company
"enjoys the full panoply of First Amendment protection for its di-
rect comments on public issues, there is no rationale for providing
similar constitutional protection when such statements are made
only in the context of commercial transactions." Cardtoons' com-
mercial speech is, in essence, a product-a fact serving to further
water down its First Amendment right to parody. That is, it seeks to
sell the very thing it now calls "speech". Balancing Cardtoons' right
to publish and sell its product versus the players' right of publicity
on the fulcrum of the First Amendment finds the scales weighing in
favor of the players. If profit is to be derived from the endeavor, it
properly belongs to the players, not Cardtoons' for it is the players
likeness and fame which brings the profit.
... Cardtoons has the First Amendment right to "parody" Ma-jor League Baseball players in a non-commercial venue. It could
simply disseminate the cards without charge or, with a few minor
revisions, Cardtoons could parody the sport (and its players) in a
traditional forum such as a book or magazine. It could even do so
in its present form (cards) if the players' likenesses were not evi-
dent. First Amendment rights end, however, when Cardtoons preys
Cardtoons, 838 F. Supp. at 1511 (quoting OKLA STAT. 12 § 1449(A)). "To prove that
§ 1449(A) has been violated, MLBPA must show that Cardtoons has: (1) 'knowingly' used
MLBPA's 'name' or 'likeness'; (2) on 'products, merchandise, or goods'; (3) without
MLBPA's prior consent. If MLBPA proves those elements, the 'burden' shifts to
Cardtoons to raise a valid defense." Id. at 1511.
86. Cardtoons, 838 F. Supp. at 1519.
87. Id. at 1519-20.
Cardtoons' marketing scheme is virtually identical to that of other baseball trad-
ing card companies and, in effect, is no different. Cardtoons' "parody cards" are a
commercial "product" such as has historically received little First Amendment
protection.
The cards do not take the form of or make use of a traditional medium, such
as newspaper, magazine, book, film or television program. Such forums have tra-
ditionally been afforded significant First Amendment protection. Not so with
commercial products. Given the evidence in this case, Cardtoons' "Baseball Par-
ody Cards" are commercial products, not traditional media.
Id. at 1520.
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on the MLBPA's names and likenesses for purely commercial
purposes.88
Magistrate Judge Wolfe explicitly based this latter, "balancing"
test conclusion on the reasoning in the opinions of three prior fair use
cases-the Southern District of New York's Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v.
Miller Brewing Co., Inc.,89 the Northern District of Georgia's Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,90 and the
United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
v. Campbell.91 In Tin Pan Apple the rap group "The Fat Boys"'92
brought a copyright infringement claim against Miller Brewing and
the advertising agency that produced a beer commercial for a Miller
brand featuring a rough parody of the group. District Court Judge
Charles S. Haight, Jr. held that Miller's parody defense was not a via-
ble one as against The Fat Boys' copyright infringement claim.93 Ac-
cording to Judge Haight's opinion, "[T]here is ample authority for the
proposition that appropriation of copyrighted material solely for per-
sonal profit, unrelieved by any creative purpose, cannot constitute
parody as [a] matter of law."94
In Original Appalachian Artworks the Georgia manufacturer of
"Cabbage Patch Kids" brought a copyright infringement claim against
Topps, which was manufacturing cards with stickers on which inter-
ested children/purchasers could find quite-similar visages of "Garbage
Pail Kids"-which "derisively depict dolls with features similar to
Cabbage Patch Kids dolls in rude, violent and frequently noxious set-
88. Id. at 1520-21 (quoting Central Hudson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563,
563 n.5 (1980)) (citations and footnote omitted). Magistrate Judge Wolfe noted:
Another factor that must be weighed are [sic] the ramifications of a decision
allowing Cardtoons a First Amendment defense in this case. Selling "commer-
cial" parodies of baseball players would obviously lead to doing the same thing
for other professional sports and entertainment. In addition, allowing "parody"
collectible trading cards would open the door to virtually any commercial prod-
uct. Opening that floodgate is neither a good nor logical idea, in the context of an
evolving pattern of cases which clearly recognize the on-going tension between
the First Amendment and property interests, such as the "right of publicity."
Id. at 1520 n.35.
"As one court aptly said: Let the word go forth there is no free ride-the commercial
hitchhiker seeking to travel on the fame of another will have to learn to pay the fare or
stand on his own two feet." Id. at 1521 (quoting Onassis v. Christian Dior, 472 N.Y.S.2d
254, 261 (Sup. Ct. 1984)).
89. 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
90. 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
91. 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1993). See infra part II.
92. Mark Morales, Darren Robinson, and Damon Wimbley. 737 F. Supp. at 827.
93. Id. at 826.
94. Id at 831.
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tings."95 District Judge G. Ernest Tidwell granted Original Appalach-
ian's motion for a preliminary injunction against Topps, in the process
holding necessarily that Topps' parody defense was not a viable one as
against Original Appalachian's copyright infringement claim. "Here,"
according to Judge Tidwell's opinion, "the primary purpose behind
defendant's parody is not an effort to make a social comment but is an
attempt to make money."'9 6
In Acuff-Rose Senior District Judge Charles W. Joiner, sitting on
the Sixth Circuit by designation, similarly reasoned that "[i]t is the
blatantly commercial purpose of the derivative work that prevents this
parody from being a fair use."97 His opinion was later reversed by the
Supreme Court.98
95. Original Appalachian Artworks, 642 F. Supp. at 1032. "The cards became very
popular in 1986 and Topps has recently begun licensing Garbage Pail Kids products such as
T-shirts, school notebooks, balloons, etc. More than 800 million stickers have been sold."
Id.
96. Id. at 1034.
The Garbage Pail Kid stickers is one of the more profitable ventures of Topps'
business history. Neither are the Garbage Pail stickers merely one of a series of
spoofs of various different products, as defendant has produced in the past, nor a
single cartoon or editorial in a broader satirical product such as Mad Magazine.
The basic concept behind the defendant's stickers is aimed at capitalizing on the
Cabbage Patch craze.
Id.
97. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114
S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
In dealing with uses popularly termed parodies, the factors involving the commer-
cial nature of the use and the damage to the defendant are of particular signifi-
cance. It is likely, for example, that an identical use of the copyrighted work in
this case at a private gathering on a not-for-profit basis would be a fair use.
Id.
See Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 71, at 671, 712. "As an extreme example of a misread-
ing of the statute and the Supreme Court fair use decisions, the Sixth Circuit's opinion in
Acuff-Rose provides the Court with an excellent vehicle to clarify the meaning of its own
statements on the issue of commercial use." Id. at 671. See also infra part II. "The Court
will also have the opportunity to address for the first time copyright parody, a type of use
that presents some unique fair use issues." Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 71, at 671.
Under the Sixth Circuit's reasoning, parody is treated no differently from any
ordinary use. If sold for money, it will be deemed commercial and presumptively
unfair, with the first factor resolved against the parodist. Indeed, the majority
opinion goes beyond any reasonable interpretation of Sony by holding that the
first factor not only may but must be resolved against fair use where the use is
commercial. This result ignores the value of parody as recognized by Congress,
commentators and other courts.
Id. at 712.
98. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
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II
The Current Jurisprudential Status of Parody
Defenses and the First Factor of the Federal
Statutory Copyright Protection's
Fair Use Exception: Justice David H. Souter's Reasoning in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Inc-Rap
In 1964 rock balladeers Roy Orbison and William Dees wrote the
song Oh, Pretty Woman 99-the tune if not the actual lyrics' °° of which
most rock-generation Americans worthy of the name are familiar.
Orbison and Dees, assigned their rights in the song to Acuff-Rose,
Inc., which registered it for copyright protection.' 01 In 1989, twenty-
five years after Oh, Pretty Woman, the rap group "2 Live Crew" paro-
99. Id. at 1168.
100. The actual lyrics as written by Orbison and Dees are:
Pretty Woman, walking down the street
Pretty Woman, the kind I like to meet,
Pretty Woman, I don't believe you, you're not the truth,
No one could look as good as you
Mercy
Pretty Woman, won't you pardon me,
Pretty Woman, I couldn't help but see,
Pretty Woman, that you look lovely as can be
Are you lonely just like me?
Pretty Woman, stop a while,
Pretty Woman, talk a while,
Pretty Woman, give your smile to me
Pretty Woman, yeah, yeah, yeah
Pretty Woman, look my way,
Pretty Woman, say you'll stay with me
'Cause I need you, I'll treat you right
Come to me baby, Be mine tonight
Pretty Woman, don't walk on by,
Pretty Woman, don't make me cry,
Pretty Woman, don't walk away,
Hey, O.K.
If that's the way it must be, O.K.
I guess I'll go on home, it's late
There'll be tomorrow night, but wait!
What do I see
Is she walking back to me?
Yeah, she's walking back to me!
Oh, Pretty Woman.
Id. at 1179 (Appendix A).
Former United States Solicitor General (and current Whitewater independent coun-
sel) Kenneth W. Starr has suggested that the Supreme Court Justices' "reliance on 'cert
memos' prepared by their clerks to review petitions has meant that the clerks' interest in
rock music lyrics has influenced the selection of cases, as witnessed by Acuff-Rose." Ernest
Gellhorn, Supreme Court Docket Skirts Critical Issues, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 5, 1994, at A21.
101. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1168.
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died the song with its Pretty Womanl° 2-both the tune and lyrics of
which, of course, most rap fans in America worthy of the name are
probably also are familiar, including, for example, "Big hairy woman
you need to shave that stuff.'1 0 3 That is rap. 2 Live Crew had sought,
but was not granted, Acuff-Rose's permission to parody Oh, Pretty
Woman.'0 4 In the year after its release, the group-Luther Campbell,
Christopher Wongwon, Mark Ross, and David Hobbs' 05-sold nearly
a quarter million copies of record, cassette-tape, and compact disc ver-
sions of As Clean As They Wanna Be, on which the parody appears."
No blockheads they either.
As a result, Acuff-Rose sued both the members of the 2 Live
Crew group and their record company 0 7 for infringement of its rights
under the Copyright Act of 1976. 2 Live Crew defended its parody on
fair use grounds, and the district court, applying § 107's four-factor
102. Id.
103. The lyrics of the parodic, rap version in full are as follows:
Pretty woman walkin' down the street
Pretty woman girl you look so sweet
Pretty woman you bring me down to that knee
Pretty woman you make me wanna beg please
Oh, pretty woman
Big hairy woman you need to shave that stuff
Big hairy woman you know I bet it's tough
Big hairy woman all that hair ain't legit
'Cause you look like 'Cousin It'
Big hair woman
Bald headed woman your hair won't grow
Bald headed woman you got a teeny weeny afro
Bald headed woman you know your hair could look nice
Bald headed woman first you got to roll it with rice
Bald headed woman here, let me get this hunk of biz for ya
Ya know what I'm saying you look better than rice a roni
Oh bald headed woman
Big hairy woman come on in
And don't forget your bald headed friend
Hey pretty woman let the boys
Jump in
Two timin' woman girl you know it ain't right
Two timin' woman you's out with my boy last night
Two timin' woman that takes a load off my mind
Two timin' woman now I know the baby ain't mine
Oh, two timin' woman
Oh pretty woman
Id. at 1179-80 (Appendix B). Compare supra note 100.
104. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1168.
105. Id.
106. Id. The albums and compact discs identify Orbison and Dees as the authors and
Acuff-Rose as the publisher of the original song. Id.
107. Id. 2 Live Crew's record company is Luke Skywalker Records. Id.
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test, granted 2 Live Crew's motion for summary judgment, holding,
inter alia, that the commercial purpose of the song was no bar to the
group's fair use defense. °8 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the decision, considering the district court to have put "too lit-
tle emphasis on the fact that 'every commercial use . . . is
presumptively unfair' 10 9 and holding "that 'the admittedly commer-
cial nature' of the parody 'requires the conclusion' that the first of
108. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150,1154-55 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
"Obviously," according to the federal district court's Chief Judge, Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr.,
2 Live Crew's song is included on a commercially distributed record album sold
for the purpose of making a profit.
Importantly for the purposes of this case, it is plain that 2 Live Crew also
desired to parody the original version of "Oh, Pretty Woman." In copyright law,
courts have long recognized that satirical expression is "deserving of substantial
freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social and literary criticism."
Including parody within the fair use doctrine has been recognized as "a means of
fostering the creativity protected by the copyright law."
Many parodies "distributed commercially may be 'more in the nature of an
editorial or social commentary than.., an attempt to capitalize financially on the
plaintiff's original work."'
2 Live Crew is an anti-establishment rap group and this song derisively demon-
strates how bland and banal the Orbison song seems to them.
Although the Court has determined that 2 Live Crew's version parodies the
original, a finding of a parody does not necessarily equate with a finding of fair
use. "Parody was not classified as a presumptively fair use .... Each assertion of
the 'parody defense' must be considered individually, in light of the statutory
facts, reason, experience, and of course, the general principles developed in past
cases." As a result, the Court will examine the remaining three statutory ele-
ments of § 107.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
109. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1168 (citing Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d
1429, 1435 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 451 (1984))). See Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 71, at 700-01. "This passage"
from Sony
has haunted fair use ever since, appearing in some form in virtually every com-
mercial, use case of the past decade. Absent from theses subsequent opinions,
however, has been serious analysis of what the statement means. The conclusion
is inescapable from both textual and the historical context that the Court did not
intend to establish a true presumption in the technical sense, shifting burdens of
production or proof. Nor would such a presumption be appropriate as a method
of determining the affirmative defense of fair use.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Contra Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d
Cir. 1986) ("we do not read [the relevant passage] as altering the traditional multi-factor
fair use inquiry").
According to the opinion of Senior District Judge Charles W. Joiner in Acuff-Rose,
sitting on the appellate court by designation,
[I]t is understandable that both the parties and the district court focus on parody
in their analyses of fair use. However, because the text of section 107 lists specific
fair uses, we find that the term parody must be either subsumed within the statu-
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four factors relevant under the statute weighs against a finding of fair
use."
110
The Supreme Court reversed this decision because, according to
Justice Souter's opinion for a unanimous Court, the commercial na-
ture of a parody cannot render it presumptively unfair."' The Court
held that "a parody's commercial character is only one element to be
weighed in a fair use enquiry, and that insufficient consideration was
given to the nature of parody in weighing the degree of copying.""1
2
Moreover, any application of § 107, according to his opinion,
is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the
doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis .... Nor may
the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another.
All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of
the purposes of copyright.' 1 3
"The Court of Appeals, however," Justice Souter later expands,
in a portion of the opinion here quoted at length,
immediately cut short the enquiry into 2 Live Crew's fair use claim
by confining its treatment of the first factor essentially to one rele-
tory terms "criticism" or "comment," or be an entirely separate category of
exception.
Unfortunately, the terminology of the fair use analysis has evolved in such a
way that the popular definition of parody and the statutory definition of parody
as a form of criticism have become somewhat confused. Popularly, the term par-
ody may be described as "when one artist, for comic effect or social commentary,
closely imitates the style of another artist and in so doing creates a new artwork
that makes ridiculous the style and expression of the original." This popular defi-
nition has been used on occasion as a synonym for that which is necessary to
create an exception to the exclusive rights in a copyrighted work. This use, we
find, creates confusion and should be avoided. Much of entertainment involves
parodies in the popular sense, but section 107 does not direct the courts to con-
clude that all such parodies are fair uses. For the purposes of this opinion, we will
assume, as found by the district court, that 2 Live Crew's song is a parody of
Acuff-Rose's copyrighted song, and proceed to determine whether the calculus of
section 107 results in a determination of fair use.
Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1435 (citation omitted). In proceeding to apply § 107-done "with
considerable reservation, as the district court's parody analysis does not, in our view, com-
port with proper analysis of the term," id. at 1435 n.8-Senior Judge Joiner's opinion con-
cluded that
[ajlthough in this case we do not set aside the district court's conclusion that 2
Live Crew's song is a criticism in the nature of a parody in the popular sense, we
nevertheless find that the district court erred in the process of determining that
the criticism constituted a fair use of the copyrighted work. We find that the
admittedly commercial nature of the derivative work-the purpose of the work
being no less important than its character in the Act's formulation-requires the
conclusion that the first factor weighs against a finding of fair use.
Id. at 1437 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 449).
110. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1168-69 (quoting Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1437).
111. Id. at 1178.
112. Id. at 1168.
113. Id. at 1170-71 (citations omitted).
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vant fact, the commercial nature of the use. The court then inflated
the significance of this fact by applying a presumption ostensibly
culled from Sony,L1141 that "every commerpial, use of copyrighted
material is presumptively ... unfair .... 115 In giving virtually
dispositive weight to the commercial nature of the parody, the
Court of Appeals erred.
The language of the statute makes clear that the commercial or
nonprofit educational purpose of a work is only one element of the
first factor enquiry into its purpose and character. Section 107(1)
uses the term "including" to begin the dependent clause referring to
commercial use, and the main clause speaks of a broader investiga-
tion into "purpose and character." As we explained in Harper &
Row,[ 116] Congress resisted attempts to narrow the ambit of this
traditional enquiry by adopting categories of presumptively fair use,
114. Id. at 1173-74 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 451). In Sony the owners of copyrights on
television programs brought a copyright infringement claim against Betamax, the manufac-
turer of home videotape recorders. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. According to Associate Justice
John Paul Stevens' opinion in Sony,
although every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair
exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright,
noncommercial uses are a different matter. A challenge to a noncommercial use
of a copyrighted work requires proof that the particular use is harmful, or that if it
should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the
copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be shown; such a requirement
would leave the copyright holder with no defense against predictable damage.
Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm will result. What is
necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful
likelihood of future harm exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, that
likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likeli-
hood must be demonstrated.
In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with regard to home
time-shifting ....
First, Sony demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of
copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free television would
not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private viewers. And sec-
ond, respondents failed to demonstrate that time-shifting would cause any likeli-
hood on non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their
copyrighted works. The Betamax is, therefore, capable of substantial noninfring-
ing uses. Sony's sale of such equipment to the general public does not constitute
contributory infringement of respondents' copyrights.
Id. at 451, 456.
115. Id. at 1174 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451).
116. Id. See Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trade-
mark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REv. 923, 957-58 (1985).
[I]n Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., the Court found that unauthorized publica-
tion of excerpts of an unpublished manuscript [President Gerald Ford's memoirs]
about to be released by the copyright owner unfairly usurped the owner's right to
license publication of such an excerpt.
This standard would be inappropriate in many cases of satiric comment on
copyrighted literary material because the satiric use would not be commercially
exploitable in the same manner.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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and it urged courts to preserve the breadth of ;heir traditionally am-
ple view of the universe of relevant evidence.1n 71 Accordingly, the
mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not insu-
late it from a finding of infringement, any more than the commer-
cial character of a use bars a finding of fairness. If, indeed,
commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fair-
ness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative
uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107, including news re-
porting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research,
since the~e 8ctivities "are generally conducted for profit in this
country."I18] Congress could not have intended such a rule, which
certainly is not inferable from the common law cases, arising as they
did from the world of letter in which Samuel Johnson could pro-
nounce lhat "[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote except for
money.' [9J
Sony itself called for no hard evidentiary presumption. There.
we emphasized the need for a "sensitive balancing of interests, [1201
noted that Congress had "eschewed a rigid, bright-line approach to
fair use,"1 211 and stated that the commercial or nonprofit educa-
tional character of a work is "not conclusive,",1122] but rathera fact
to be "weighed along with other[s] in fair use decisions." [12 31 The
Court of Appeals elevation of one sentence from Sony to a per se
rule thus runs as much counter to Sony itself as to the long common
law tradition of fair use adjudication. Rather, as we explained in
Harper & Row, Sony stands for the proposition that the "fact that a
publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a seRarate
factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use."[124] But
that is all, and the fact that even the force of that tendency will vary
with the context is a further reason against elevating commerciality
to hard presumptive significance. The use, for example, of a copy-
righted work to advertise a product, even in a parody, will be enti-
tled to less indulgence under the first factor of the fair use enquiry,
than the sale of a parody for its own sake.'
25
117. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561).
118. Id. at 1174 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
119. Id. (quoting 3 BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed. 1934)). See supra note
1 and accompanying text.
120. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40 (1984)).
121. Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 449 n.31).
122. Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-49).
123. Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 449 n.32).
124. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562).
125. Id. (footnotes added) (first alteration in original).
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III
The Post-Campbell Status of Parody Defenses to
Common Law Right of Publicity Claims:
Chief Judge Ellison's
Reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation in Cardtoons-Wit (II)
A. The Reconsideration
According to Chief Judge Ellison in his reconsideration of the
Cardtoons case, "The Court has set aside its adoption of the Report
and Recommendation and its Order of Judgment so that thorough
consideration can be given to the parties' objections ... as well as
recent authority from the Supreme Court."' 26 No blockhead Judge
Ellison. "[U]nder the standard applicable to parody under copyright
law,"' 2 7 Judge Ellison acknowledged that "Cardtoons would be eligi-
ble for a fair use analysis."' 28 Upon reviewing.the three fair use cases
relied upon in the Report to support the proposition that commercial
parodies cannot assert a fair use defense, Judge Ellison (correctly)
noted:
* of Tin Pan Apple'29 that since "Tin Pan Apple involved a product
devoid of any creative aspect"'130 and "Cardtoons are a mixed use
[in that] the cards were created for commercial profit, and they pos-
126. Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868 F. Supp. 1266, 1267 (N.D.
Okla. 1994). See Jares, supra note 78.
127. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1271.
The Court will not firmly employ any one test in weighing MLBPA's right of
publicity, for the simple reason that one has not yet been devised. When guide-
lines for judicial application of a law to a set of specific facts do not exist, a ra-
tional response is to reach out to a like area of law and adopt a test that has
survived years of application. The Magistrate Judge decided the question of a
parody defense to the right of publicity by applying tests developed in copyright
and trademark caselaw, because the right of publicity is similar to copyright and
trademark law in that these areas are within the realm of intellectual property.
Id. at 1268. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
The Magistrate applied two tests: a "use analysis" and a "balancing analy-
sis." These tests can assist the trier of fact in isolating the numerous issues that
must be considered in determining the extent of the right of publicity. The strict
application of either of these tests to a right of publicity case, however, can result
in various factors receiving improper consideration. The Court declines to deter-
mine the extent of the right of publicity by relying exclusively on tests developed
in other areas of the law, but will review the tests to ascertain the applicability to
the right of publicity.
Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1269.
128. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1271.
129. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
130. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1271.
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sess creative purpose,"13' "the district court's rule in Tin Pan Apple
is of minimal significance to the present case; '"132
" of Original Appalachian Artworks133 that since it "rejected a fair
use parody defense because 'the primary purpose behind the de-
fendant's parody is not an effort to make a social comment but is an
attempt to make money"' 134 and the Supreme Court clarified fair
use in Campbell "by demot[ing] 'commercial purpose' from its mis-
perceived status as a determinative factor to that of one among sev-
eral factors, the Court must look elsewhere for guidance;"'135 and,
* of the Sixth Circuit's Acuff-Rose136 that it "was unanimously re-
jected by the Supreme Court for its excess reliance on the commer-
cial purpose factor."'137
Having thus found the reasoning in these three cases "to be of
minimal application to the present case," Chief Judge Ellison "judges
Cardtoons' parody defense by applying a 'use analysis' drawn from
copyright law, with reference to the Supreme Court's discussion of
First Amendment protections for parody in Acuff-Rose.' 1 38 His ap-
plication of this fair use analysis's first factor-which, he found,
weighs in favor of fair use by Cardtoons-is also here quoted at some
considerable length: "Cardtoons trading cards are a commercial prod-
uct. The cards were created to be distributed and sold in interstate
commerce. [139] Cardtoons trading cards express opinions on matters
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1271-72.
133. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
134. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1272 (quoting Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1986)).
135. Id. (citation omitted).
136. See supra notes 97, 112, and accompanying text.
137. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1272.
In overturning the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court stated, "[in giving virtually
dispositive weight to the commercial nature of the parody, the Court of Appeals
erred." While the Report did not give "virtually dispositive" weight to the finding
that Cardtoons trading cards are of a commercial nature, that finding was fea-
tured in the Report's analysis and conclusion.
Id. (citation omitted).
138. Id.
139. Cf. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Dad's Kid Corp., 806 F. Supp. 458
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). In Dad's Kid the MLBPA filed an unsuccessful trademark-infringement
and right of publicity action against the manufacturer of "'Tri-Cards,' a concededly high-
quality attractive use of previously purchased authentic baseball cards bought by Dad's
Kid for full price from one of plaintiff's licensees." Id. at 459.
The fact that an enormous secondary market exists for baseball cards and
baseball card derivative works leads me to conclude on this record that baseball
players have little if any continuing publicity rights with respect to the use and
reuse of their pictures on cards by subsequent purchasers and sellers of duly li-
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of public interest, but the expression of opinion is subsidiary to, or
indistinguishable from, their commercial purpose."140
B. In the White of His Eyes-Re-Focused by the (Permissible) Pretty
Woman Parody
"A parody," Judge Ellison continues,
can be commercial in two ways: to advertise a separate product, or,
to actually be the product. In White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc., the Ninth Circuit interpreted California's right of
publicity statute. Defendant Samsung published an advertisement
which featured a robot standing on a stage before a large bank of
revolving letters. The robot was dressed in a long blond wig and a
sequined gown, and was posed with an arm outstretched. The im-
age presented was strikingly similar to elements of a popular televi-
sion game show. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the advertisement
infringed the Plaintiff's right of publicity. The nature of the com-
mercial use was the fact that the use was exactly that: a commercial.
Vanna White's likeness, in the form of costumed robot, was used to
advertise the virtues of Defendant's video cassette recorders. "The
ad's spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune is subservient and
only tangen tially related to the ad's primary message: 'buy Sam-
sung VCR's.' ' ' 14 1
censed baseball cards following a perfectly proper first sale into commerce for
which the players get a royalty.
Id. at 460.
140. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1272.
141. Id. at 1272-73 (quoting White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th
Cir. 1992)) (citations omitted).
The focus on advertising in measuring the commercial character of a parody
is maintained by the current unfinished draft of the Restatement: "if the name or
likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that has no relationship to the
identified person, the user may be subject to liability for a use of the other's iden-
tity in advertising."
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 at 182 (Tentative Draft
4, Mar. 25, 1993)) (citing Borchard, supra note 63; Hyland & Lindquist, supra note 32).
According to § 46 of the finished Restatement, "[olne who appropriates the commer-
cial value of a person's identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or
other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (emphasis added). According to the Re-
statement's § 47,
The name, likeness, and other indicia of a person's identity are used 'for
purposes of trade' under the rule stated in § 46 if they are used in advertising the
user's goods or services, or are placed on merchandise marketed by the user, or
are used in connection with services rendered by the user. However, use "for
purposes of trade" does not ordinarily include the use of a person's identity in
news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in
advertising that is incidental to such uses.
Id. § 47.
Proof that prospective purchasers are likely to believe that the identified per-
son endorses or sponsors the user's goods or services is not required for the impo-
sition of liability. Thus, the unauthorized use of another's name or likeness in
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:633
PARODY, PARITY, AND PUBLICITY
"In contrast," he concluded,
Cardtoons trading cards are not an advertisement for anything ex-
cept themselves. "The use, for example, of a copyrighted work to
advertise a product, even in a parody, will be entitled to less indul-
gence under the first factor of the, fair use enquiry, than the sale of a
parody for its own sake ... ,,[142] While the Supreme Court's anal-
ysis does not directly address the distinction between the two afore-
mentioned types of commercial use, it does recognize that a parody
sold for profit has a stronger claim to First Amendment protection
than a parody used to advertise another unrelated product.
143
Nevertheless, the MLBPA has appealed this reconsideration to
the Tenth Circuit, and that appeal is currently pending.'"
IV
Distinguishing Between Advertising and Other Types
of Commercial Speech
Chief Judge Ellison was correct; Justice Souter's analysis for the
Court in Campbell did not directly address any distinction between
advertising and other forms of commercial speech. The Court cannot
directly address such a distinction in one of the two major commercial
speech cases in its current Term-Bentsen v. Adolph Coors Co.145-
because the commercial party did not even appeal such a district-
court-level distinction (adverse to it) to the Tenth Circuit. Justice Ste-
newspaper or magazine advertisements, in television or radio commercials, or in
other solicitations of prospective purchasers will ordinarily subject the user to
liability for infringement of the other's right of publicity.
Id. § 47 cmt. a.
142. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994)).
143. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1273.
144. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Cardtoons, No. 95-5006 (10th Cir. filed
Jan. 18, 1995).
145. 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2671 (June 14, 1994) (No. 93-
1631). This case was under consideration by the Supreme Court as this Article went to
press. See Claudia MacLachlan, On Tap at the High Court: Coors Fights Beer Label Ban,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 28, 1994, at B1.
The current Term's other commercial speech case is the pending Florida Bar v. Mc-
Henry, 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 42 (Sept. 26, 1994) (No. 94-
226), regarding a Florida Bar Association prohibition on the sending by attorneys of
targeted, direct-mail solicitations to accident victims or their relatives within 30 days of the
accident. See Tony Mauro, Justices Cool to Curbs on Lawyers' Pitches, LEGAL TIMES, Jan.
16, 1995, at 8.
It's hard to say whether the justices [sic] think the image of the legal profes-
sion is beyond repair, or beyond the power of the states to do anything about, or
merely that the justices [sic] have climbed aboard the commercial speech band-
wagon-whose riders believe that if the speech is not misleading or fraudulent, it
is protected by the First Amendment.
Id. See also Marcia Coyle, Fla. Bar Asks High Court to Take a Hard Look at Ads, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 23, 1995, at All.
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vens' opinion for the Court in another commercial speech case, 14 6
however, did directly address such a distinction in obiter dicta.147 Dis-
covery, which-was not considered by Chief Judge Ellison in his re-
examination of Cardtoons, is from the same Term as Campbell, which
caused Chief Judge Ellison to reconsider Cardtoons. Perhaps the
Tenth Circuit will consider Justice Stevens' Discovery dicta in defining
the scope of a parody exception to the right of publicity in Cardtoons.
If not, perhaps someday some other court will do so, if given the op-
portunity by any further attempt-driven by a desire to create the
conditions necessary to negate the adverse effects of White-to create
such an exception.
A. United States District Court Judge Zita L. Weinshienk's Reasoning-
Suds
The statute at issue in Coors is the Federal Alcohol Administra-
tion Act (FAAA) of 193514a-passed just two years after the Twenty-
First Amendment repealed Prohibition. The FAAA prevents com-
mercial producers of certain alcoholic beverages from including the
alcohol content both:
in any promotional advertisements for such beverages' 49-certainly
quite easily cast as the conceptual equivalent to the (impermissibly)
parodic Samsung television advertisements at issue in White 5 0
therefore; and,
146. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
147. Id. at 1511-14.
148. 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-211 (1988).
149. Id. § 205(f)(2).
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in business as a distiller, brewer,
rectifier, blender, or other producer, or as an importer or wholesaler, of distilled
spirits, wine, or malt beverages, or as a bottler, or warehouseman and bottler, of
distilled spirits, directly or indirectly or through an affiliate:
(f) ADVERTISING
To publish or disseminate or cause to be published or disseminated by radio
broadcast, or in any newspaper, periodical or other publication or by any sign or
outdoor advertisement or any other printed or graphic matter, any advertisement
of distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, if such advertisement is in, or is calcu-
lated to induce sales in, interstate or foreign commerce, or is disseminated by
mail, unless such advertisement is in conformity with such regulations, to be pre-
scribed by the Secretary of the Treasury... (2) as will provide the consumer with
adequate information as to the identity and quality of the products advertised, the
alcoholic content thereof (except the statements of, or statements likely to be con-
sidered as statements of, alcoholic content of malt beverages and wines are
prohibited).
Id. (emphasis added).
150. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text; Appendix A.
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e on the actual containers of such beverages themselves' 5 1-1iterally
the actual, "for-sale" products in and of themselves and, again, cer-
tainly quite easily cast as the conceptual equivalent to the (permissi-
bly) parodic trading cards at issue in Cardtoons.152
"The commercial speech at issue in this case provides only accurate
and specific information about the contents of a beverage
container." '153 That is suds. In 1987, Adolph Coors Co. sought and
was denied permission from the United States Department of the
Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) to dis-
151. 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2).
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in business as a distiller, brewer,
rectifier, blender, or other producer, or as an importer or wholesaler, of distilled
spirits, wine, or malt beverages, or as a bottler, or warehouseman and bottler, of
distilled spirits, directly or indirectly or through an affiliate:
(e) LABELING
To sell or ship or deliver for sale or shipment, or otherwise introduce in inter-
state or foreign commerce, or to receive therein, or to remove from customs cus-
tody for consumption, any distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages in bottles,
unless such products are bottled packaged, and labeled in conformity with such
regulations, to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, with respect to
packaging, marking, branding, and labeling an size and fill of container... (2) as
will provide the consumer with adequate information as to the identity and qual-
ity of the products, the alcohol content thereof (except that statements of, or state-
ments likely to be considered as statements of, alcoholic content of malt beverages
are prohibited unless required by State law and except that, in case of wines, state-
ments of alcoholic content shall be required only for wines containing more than 14
per centum of alcohol by volume).
Id.
152. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text; Appendix B.
153. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of the Re-
spondent at 5, Bentsen v. Adolph Coors Co., 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114
S. Ct. 2671 (June 13, 1994) (No. 93-1631). (Interestingly, the Washington Legal Foundation
also filed an amicus brief in support of the Florida Bar restriction on attorneys' commercial
speech at issue in McHenry. See supra note 145.)
See John F. Kamp & Jay Fisher (senior vice president and adjunct attorney, respec-
tively, American Association of Advertising Agencies, Washington, D.C.), Supreme Court
Should Strike Down New-Prohibitionist Restrictions on Commercial Speech in Coors Case,
4:24 LEGAL OPINION LETTER (Washington Legal Foundation), Sept. 23, 1994.
This case illustrates a rising danger in our society. Government regulates
product information for a stated purpose with the unstated desire of reducing
consumption of a legal product. The federal government outlaws truthful labeling
of alcohol content to prevent "strength wars" hoping that it also reduces alcohol
intake. The Supreme Court should fully explicate the high hurdles that the gov-
ernment must leap to prove that a restriction on commercial speech "directly ad-
vances" a legitimate governmental interest. Extreme deference to legislative
reasoning must not be allowed. Failure to follow this advice will allow the govern-
ment to continue surreptitiously eroding free speech rights, particularly those of
companies with products currently in disfavor.
Id. at 2.
1995] PARODY, PARITY, AND PUBLICITY
close the alcohol content of its malt beverages. 154 Coors sued in fed-
eral district court, alleging that both of the commercial speech,
content restrictions violated its right to free speech as guaranteed by
the First Amendment. 155
1. Her Initial, 1989 Grant of Summary Judgment for Coors in Adolph
Coors Co. v. Baker
District Court Judge Weinshienk initially granted Coors' sum-
mary-judgment motion as to both restrictions in May 1989.156 After
dispensing with the first part of the Supreme Court's four-part analy-
sis of governmental regulations of commercial speech as detailed in'
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York, 157 Judge Weinshienk stated that
[w]e then go to the second test of Central Hudson, and that is
whether the asserted government interest is substantial. And per-
haps that should be considered with the third test, which is whether
154. Coors, 2 F.3d at 356.
155. Id.
See Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
The Treasury admitted in its answer that sections 205(e)(2) and 205(f)(2) are
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The Justice Department, acting on
behalf of the Treasury and BATF, also asserted that the Executive Branch be-
lieved restricting the labeling and advertising of the alcoholic content of malt bev-
erages to be unconstitutional. The House, however, moved to intervene in order
to defend the constitutionality of the statute.
Id.
156. Reporter's Transcript, Baker, supra note 15, at 46-59.
157. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Central Hudson the Court held unconstitutional a regula-
tion of the New York Public Service Commission that completely banned promotional
advertising by the electrical-utility plaintiff. Id. at 561.
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive an-
swers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the govern-
mental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.
Id. at 566 (quoted in Reporter's Ttanscript, Brady, supra note 17, at 49). See Richard E.
Wiley, et al., Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 6:1 NLCPI (NATIONAL LEGAL
CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST) WHITE PAPER 30 (Feb. 1994).
It is not surprising that the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson
balancing test have proved to be the major battleground over which commercial
speech arguments continue. Whether a restriction works to "directly advance" a
state interest (and thus fulfill the third prong of the test) depends on both the
particular facts of a case and, to some extent, a court's subjective judgment. Like-
wise, determining whether the means to an end (a challenged restriction) and the
end itself (the state's asserted goal) fit together closely enough to satisfy the
fourth prong is another elusive matter.
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the regulation or in this case, the statute, directly advances the gov-
ernmental interest.
Do we have a substantial interest in preventing consumers from
knowing the alcoholic content? And it appears to the court that the
answer has to be no.158
Central Hudson's third test, according to Judge Weinshienk, presents
"an interesting question, because we still have the ability of the BATF
to regulate, if this statute is declared unconstitutional, in violation of
the First Amendment. We still have the opportunity for regulation to
make sure that there is no misleading type of information given. 159
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit 6 ' reversed and remanded.' 6' That
court held that both the "fact that the malt beverage industry and
158. Reporter's Transcript, Baker, supra note 15, at 51-54.
It's very difficult for the Court to see how there is any unfair competition or
antitrust aspect to this. We do not have the same fair competition problems that
existed in the 30's; and of course, this court must look to the present time and the
present situation in looking at these tests in Hudson.
Under the present situation, with fewer brewers producing a large percent-
age of the market, we certainly don't have the same situation as the 1930 situation
of 680-plus brewers brewing beers in small factories, and so forth Fair competi-
tion, I have to agree with the plaintiff, is really not an interest.
Consumer deception? ... [Ilt appears to me that in the 80's, we have knowl-
edgeable consumers, we have consumers who have an interest in knowing alco-
holic content, not just because of mere curiosity but because of the very
important advent of the automobile and other forms of transportation ....
Alcohol content is important for consumers to know in many different re-
spects .... The status quo, which does not let a consumer know the difference
between alcoholic content of light beers and very strong malt liquor, for example,
has to be more deceiving than letting this information be available to the public.
Id. at 52-53.
159. Id. at 53-54. Regarding the importance of knowing alcohol content-and the fact
that Coors seemingly "can't win" when it comes to putting such.on its labels-see Jay
Mathews, Youth Officials Fault Coors' Zima: Experts on Underage Drinking Cite Its Sweet
Taste, Lack of Color, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 8, 1995, at A3.
Officer Mary Carlin of the Montgomery County division of the Maryland-
National Capital Park Police said park police officers began finding unruly teens
drinking Zima last spring, shortly after it was introduced. Some of the youths
insisted it was not alcoholic ....
The parents of the inebriated youths, Carlin said, "didn't even realize what
they were drinking was alcohol."
Id.
160. With the Treasury Department now defending "the constitutionality of the statu-
tory sections," Coors, 944 F.2d at 1546, and "the Justice Department now arguing for the
Act's constitutionality," Kamp & Fisher, supra note 153, at 2.
See MacLachlan, supra note 145, at B2. "When you don't defend them, Congress gets
very annoyed." Id. (quoting former U.S. Solicitor General Charles Fried, now a professor
at Harvard Law School, author of the Washington Legal Foundation amicus brief in the
case). "This does not seem like an issue worth annoying Congress over. This is a piece of
nonsense. I think [government lawyers] are going to get their heads handed to them, and I
don't think they care." Id. (quoting Professor Fried) (alteration in original).
161. Coors, 944 F.2d at 1554.
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market have changed does not compel the conclusion that strength
wars are no longer a real danger to the consuming public as well as to
the brewers"162 and the "interests asserted by Congress and demon-
strated in the legislative history are legitimate and substantial." '163
The court concluded that
there are genuine issues of material fact underlying the question of
whether the federal regulation of alcohol content advertising con-
tent directly advances the government's asserted interest in prevent-
ing strength wars, and whether the complete prohibition of such
advertising results in a "reasonable fit" between the legislature's
goal and the means chosen to reach it.16
2. On Remand from the Tenth Circuit in 1992
On remand, Judge Weinshienk concluded in October 1993 that
the portion of the FAAA restricting the content includable in promo-
tional advertising for the actual, "for-sale," alcoholic beverage prod-
ucts themselves was constitutional.1 65 She further held, however, that
the portion restricting the content which could be included on the la-
bels of the actual alcoholic beverage products themselves was uncon-
stitutional."6 "Now," according to Judge Weinshienk's re-analysis,
"the evidence in this case concerning strength wars relating to malt
liquor is substantial and convinces this court that as to" the advertising
restriction, "I am satisfied and convinced that the defendant has met
its burden. The prohibition of advertising does advance the Govern-
ment's legitimate interest in-as to strength wars and as to preventing
strength wars. And I don't think that the plaintiff is in real dispute
with this position.' ' 67 In fact, Coors did not appeal this holding.
168
162. Id. at 1548.
163. Id. at 1554.
164. Id.
165. Reporter's Transcript, Brady, supra note 17, at 4-5.
166. Id. at 9.
167. Id. at 4.
"Plaintiff agrees that ATF must regulate statements of alcoholic content in connection
with advertising. Plaintiff also tells us in argument that Coors has no intention of market-
ing products based on alcoholic strength and is not asking for this." Id. Judge Weinshienk
agreed
after hearing the evidence in this case that attempts to market alcoholic content
as a product attribute are not legitimate attempts. They are contrary to substan-
tial congressional policy.
Therefore, the Court determines after listening to the evidence and the argu-
ments of counsel that the statement in 27 United States Code section 205(f)(2)
meets the test set forth in Fox III and in the Tenth Circuit opinion.
Id. at 4-5 (citing Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989)).
In Fox the Court held constitutional a State University of New York (SUNY) regula-
tion prohibiting commercial enterprises from conducting product demonstrations in cam-
pus dormitories against a First Amendment, free speech challenge to it by students
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As for that portion of the FAAA restricting the content includ-
able on labels, Judge Weinshienk found that
[njo evidence that I have heard has convinced me that [prohibiting]
placing the alcoholic content on the can or other container will di-
rectly advance the Government's interest in preventing strength
wars. Although the Tenth Circuit spoke in terms of advertising, but
it is important to note that [the relevant statutory subsection] refers
to labeling. The content of alcohol on the can is not really advertis-
ing as we generally think of it.169
working for a company selling housewares to college students and wanting to host a "Tup-
perware party" at SUNY's Cortland campus to do so. "There is no doubt," the Court
found, that the
"Tupperware parties" the students seek to hold "propose a commercial transac-
tion," which is the test for identifying commercial speech. They also touch on
other subjects, however, such as how to be financially responsible and how to run
an efficient home. Relying on Riley v. National Federation of Blind of North Car-
olina, Inc., respondents contend that here pure speech and commercial speech are
"inextricably intertwined," and that the entirety must therefor be classified as
noncommercial. We disagree.
Riley involved a state-law requirement that in conducting fundraising for
charitable organizations (which we have held to be fully protected speech) profes-
sional fundraisers must insert in their presentations a statement setting forth the
percentage of charitable contributions collected during the previous 12 months
that were actually turned over to charities (instead of retained as commission). In
response to the State's contention that the statement was merely compelled com-
mercial speech, we responded that, if so, it was "inextricably intertwined with
otherwise fully protected speech," and that the level of First Amendment scrutiny
must depend upon "the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of
the compelled statement thereon." There, of course, the commercial speech (if it
was that) was "inextricably intertwined" because the state law required it to be
included. By contrast, there is nothing whatever "inextricable" about the non-
commercial aspects of these presentations. No law of man or of nature makes it
impossible to sell housewares without teaching home economics, or to teach
home economics without selling housewares.
Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-74 (quoting Riley, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)) (citations
and footnote omitted).
168. See Barnett, supra note 50, at 21. "Current behavior by the advertising industry-
and its lawyers-suggests a weakness in the breed. Economic self-interest may keep the
ads coming, but it doesn't protects ads from self-censorship. And the ad industry would
rather switch than fight." Id. "No one seems willing to defend ... claims to freedom of
speech in advertising." Id. at 23. But see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, 855 F. Supp. 811 (D. Md. 1994) (holding constitutional a city ordinance ban-
ning certain billboard advertisements for alcoholic beverages against a First Amendment,
free speech challenge to it by alcohol producer and advertising agency).
169. Reporter's Transcript, Brady, supra note 17, at 4-5.
[Allthough in closing argument yesterday, [then-Coors' attorney K. Preston]
Oade talked about whether the picture of a can, for example, of Coors beer with
an alcoholic content listed on it could be advertised in the media, or would it have
to sit down on a bed of flowers with the flowers or the decoration covering the
alcoholic content.
I don't think I really have to decide that specific issue. I prefer to think of
the issue that has been presented.
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To Judge Weinshienk the issue was the "difference between the
labeling of the alcoholic content on the container and the advertising
of alcoholic content as an attribute of the beer and marketing it in that
way,"' 7 ° and her conclusion was that "[p]rohibiting the alcoholic con-
tent disclosure of malt beverages on labels has little, if anything, to do
with the type of advertising that promotes strength wars.' 171
Id. at 5.
170. Id. at 5-6.
[T]he two statutes that are before us actually spell out-one says "labeling" as a
heading, the other says "advertising." The advertising one, as we've just dis-
cussed, stands. The labeling statute, from the evidence I've heard, does not meet
the test. So even though the Tenth Circuit is talking in terms of advertising or
uses the word "advertising," I'm going to consider that as meaning advertising
and labeling.
Id. at 6.
171. Id. at 6. "That is the conclusion I reach from listening to the testimony and read-
ing the depositions." Id.
Now, the goal may be substantial in this case; but whether the means to that
goal prohibiting the listing of alcoholic content on a can or a bottle is necessary
for the goal, whether the goal has been sufficiently calculated in that prohibition,
is what concerns the Court. The evidence that I have heard in this case does not
show me that there is any real connection with this.
Id at 7.
Drinkers, -according to Judge Weinshienk's view of the evidence,
want to know the alcoholic content. They want the information; and the indica-
tion is they want it not to drink higher-alcohol beer but to be more responsible
and for many to reduce the alcoholic content of what they're drinking ....
The evidence shows that the high-strength brews do not have the same popu-
lar appeal as the low-strength and the light beers ....
In the deposition of Mr. Black, who has been with the ATF many years, he
indicates that he supports disclosure of alcoholic content. He would not be op-
posed to a change in the statute as long as ATF could regulate the advertising.
And I think that's really the key. As long as the advertising does not promote
"Buy a beer because it' s stronger," quote/unquote, as long as ATF has a hand in
the advertising, there is little danger of strength wars.
Basically, I could go through the testimony of all the witnesses I've heard...
and none of the witnesses, none of the depositions that I have read, no credible
evidence that I have heard, lead me to believe that giving alcoholic' content on
labels will in any way promote strength-alcoholic strength wars, as long as ATF
has the authority to regulate the use of this content in advertising.
And therefore, the Court concludes that subparagraph (e)-and we're again
for the record talking about 27 U.S.C. section 205(e)(2) and the exception
therein-does not make a reasonable fit, does not advance the government inter-
est, and is an unconstitutional restraint on commercial speech.
Id. at 7-9. Cf. Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding government could not enforce content ban on use of name
"Crazy Horse" on alcoholic beverage labels).
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Washington Legal Foundation at 6 n.2, Bentsen (No.
93-1631) (brief filed sub. nom. Bentsen v. Coors Brewing Co.).
Of course there are difficulties in identifying what constitutes advertising and
promotion in contrast to the straightforward furnishing of an unvarnished fact
here. But this case does not present a need to address that difficulty because the
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Again, the government appealed this holding, the Tenth Circuit
Court affirmed, 72 and the case is currently pending before the
Supreme Court. 173
B. Justice John Paul Stevens' Post-"Coors-on-Remand" Reasoning of
Obiter Dicta in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc.-Ink
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 174 was one of three
major commercial speech cases considered by the Supreme Court in
its 1993-94 Term 175 that, "[w]hile it involved a very mundane subject,
government explicitly acknowledges that its chosen means of regulation is keep-
ing consumers ignorant, not protecting them from misleading or overly insistent
importuning. The regulation of advertising may involve considerations analogous
to those amici in support of Petitioners raise here, but the government has at-
tempted no such more nuanced regulation and so the issue is not presented.
Id.
172. Coots, 2 F.3d 355.
[T]he Government has offered no evidence to indicate that the appearance of
factual statements of alcohol content on malt beverage labels would lead to
strength wars or that their continued prohibition helps to prevent strength wars.
Instead, it has offered only inferential arguments that are based on mere specula-
tion and conjecture and fails to show that the prohibition advances the Govern-
ment's interest in a direct and material way.
Id. at 359.
173. Bentsen v. Adolph Coors Co., 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct.
2671 (June 13, 1994) (No. 93-1631). After certiorari was granted, the Court allowed the
Respondent to substitute Coors Brewing Company for Adolph Coors Company. Bentsen
v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 11 (1994) (granting motion to substitute party).
174. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
175. The Term's other two commercial speech cases were Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct.
1792 (1993), and United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
In Edenfield-"strongly supportive of commercial speech rights," MacLachlan, supra
note 145, at B2-the Court held unconstitutional a Florida ban on in-person solicitation by
certified public accountants. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1796. "Discovery Network and Eden-
field confirm the growing stature commercial speech enjoys before the Court." John G.
Roberts, Jr., The 1992-93 Supreme Court, in THE PUB. INTEREST L. REv. 107, 115 (Roger
Clegg & Leonard A. Leo eds. 1994).
And in Edge-"regarded as worrisome by free speech advocates," MacLachlan, supra
note 145, at B2-the Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and upheld two
federal statutes prohibiting the broadcast of lottery advertising in nonlottery states, while
concurrently allowing such advertising in a lottery state, against First and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges by the owner and operator of a licensed radio station in a nonlot-
tery state near the border of a lottery state. Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2703. "One of the reasons
that the Coors case matters," according to First Amendment specialist Floyd Abrams of
New York's Cahill Gordon & Reindel, speaking before the Coors opinion, "is it will help
us find out the interrelationship between those three cases. Does Edge deliberately send a
very different message about commercial speech?" MacLachlan, supra note 145, at B2
(quoting Floyd Abrams).
"Unfortunately, we will have to await further word from the Supreme Court as to
what the three cases mean and how they affect the scope of advertising's constitutional
protections." Wiley, supra note 157, at46.
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.. is of more than passing or esoteric interest to the advertising indus-
try. ' 176 "[M]otivated by its interest in the safety and attractive ap-
pearance of its streets and sidewalks,' 77 the Court considered a
provision of the Cincinnati Municipal Code prohibiting the distribu-
tion of what it termed "commercial handbills"-that is ink-on public
property. 178 The Code thereafter defined "commercial handbill" al-
most in whole by whether or not such a publication is in and of itself
or in large part includes promotional advertising 179-0nce again, cer-
tainly easily cast as the conceptual equivalent to both the (impermissi-
bly) parodic Samsung television advertisements at issue in White180
and the (constitutionally regulable) putative alcoholic beverage adver-
tisements (at least initially) at issue in Coors.'18 Another provision in
the same Code, however, explicitly permitted the distribution of what
it termed "newspapers."' 82 That, too, is ink. However, the Code did
not thereafter define "newspapers"-although they are "for-sale"
products in and of themselves that, yet again, are conceptually
equivalent to both the (permissibly) parodic "for-sale" trading cards
176. The First Amendment Lives--Even for Advertisers, 8:4 AD LAW [2] (June 1993)
("Memorandum to Clients," from the New York law firm of Hall, Dickler, Lawler, Kent &
Friedman) [hereinafter The First Amendment Lives].
177. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1507.
178. Id. at 1507-08.
179. According to Cincinnati Municipal Code § 714-1-C (1992):
"Commercial Handbill" shall mean any printed or written matter, dodger,
circular, leaflet, pamphlet, paper, booklet or any other printed or otherwise re-
produced original or copies of any matter of literature:
(a) Which advertises for sale any merchandise, product, commodity or thing;
or
(b) Which directs attention to any business or mercantile or commercial es-
tablishment, or other activity, for the purpose of directly promoting the
interest thereof by sales; or
(c) Which directs attention to or advertises any meeting, theatrical perform-
ance, exhibition or event of any kind for which an admission fee is
charged for the purpose of private gain or profit.
Id.
See The First Amendment Lives, supra note 176.
Perhaps the City of Cincinnati really couldn't be blamed. In recent years,
our Chief Justice, Mr. Rehnquist, had expressed himself in a number of cases to
the effect that advertising was unimportant, of low value in the scheme of things,
and was never intended by the Constitutional fathers to be protected.
Id.
180. See supra notes 28-29, 150, and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
182. According to Cincinnati Municipal Code § 862-1 (1992):
[p]ermission is hereby granted to any person or persons lawfully authorized to
engage in the business of selling newspapers to occupy space on the sidewalks of
city streets for selling newspapers, either in the morning or afternoon, where per-
mission has been obtained from the owner or tenant of the adjoining building.
Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1511 n.15 (quoting Cincinnati Municipal Code § 862-1).
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at issue in Cardtoons183 and the (not constitutionally regulable) "for-
sale" alcoholic beverage, with labels, at issue in Coors.'84 Combined,
then, the two Cincinnati Code provisions "effectively grant[ ] distribu-
tors of 'newspapers,' such as the Cincinnati Post, USA 7bday, and the
Wall Street Journal, access to the public sidewalks through newsracks,
while denying that same access to distributors of 'commercial
handbills." 1 85
In 1990, two publishers of free magazines186 available on sidewalk
"newsracks" were notified by the city's Director of Public Works that
their permits to use dispensing devices on public property had been
revoked because they were considered "commercial handbills" within
the meaning of that portion of the Code.187 After an adverse decision
from the city's Sidewalk Appeals Committee, the two publishers sued
in federal district court, alleging that the commercial speech, content
prohibition violated their right to free speech as guaranteed by the
First Amendment. 88
District Court Judge S. Arthur Spiegel of the Southern District of
Ohio, finding that both publications were to be considered commer-
cial speech entitled to the same amount of First Amendment protec-
tion because they concerned lawful activity and were not misleading,
concluded that "the regulatory scheme advanced by the City of Cin-
cinnati completely prohibiting the distribution of commercial hand-
bills on the public right of way violates the First Amendment."'18 9 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this de-
cision, agreeing with District Judge Spiegel that the burden placed on
the two publications' commercial speech was not "a 'reasonable fit'
between the ends asserted and the means chosen to advance them."'"
183. See supra notes 77-81, 152, and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
185. Discovery Network, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 946 F.2d 464, 465 (6th Cir. 1991),
affd, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
186. Discovery Network, Inc. and Harmon Publishing Company, Inc. Discovery, 113 S.
Ct. at 1508. Discovery Network
is engaged in the business of providing adult educational, recreational, and social
programs to individuals in the Cincinnati area. It advertises those programs in a
free magazine that it publishes nine times a year. Although these magazines con-
sist primarily of promotional material pertaining to Discovery's courses, they also
include some information about current events of general interest.
Id. Harmon Publishing "publishes and distributes a free magazine that advertises real es-
tate for sale at various locations throughout the United States. The magazine contains
listings and photographs in the greater Cincinnati area, and also includes some information
about interest rates, market trends, and other real estate matters." Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Discovery, 946 F.2d at 468.
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In so doing, however, the Sixth Circuit, did not consider the "newspa-
pers" to be commercial speech-noting that
we find it somewhat analogous to denominate as "non-commercial"
institutions such as the New York Times and Gannett (publisher of
the Cincinnati Post), each of which has assets and revenues in the
billions of dollars, and profits in the many millions of dollars.
Obviously, a quite significant part of the space in "newspapers"
is devoted to purely commercial activities, while publications such
as plaintiffs' may (and certainly could easily) contain some editorial
material, such as comments or articles on education or real estate
matters. The First Amendment by its terms does not make this dis-
tinction; it protects "speech." 191
The Supreme Court, in "a big surprise,"192 affirmed the Sixth Cir-
cuit's holding in the case regarding the Code's lack of a "reasonable
fit" between ends and means.193 More importantly for our purposes,
though, obiter dicta'94 in Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court-in an
extended portion of his opinion quoted here at some quite considera-
ble length because of its relevance-expanded upon the circuit court's
peremptory distinction between advertisements and other forms of
commercial speech:
This very case illustrates the difficulty of drawing bright lines
that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category. For
respondents' publications share important characteristics with the
publications that the city classifies as "newspapers." Particularly,
they are "commercial handbills" within the meaning of § 714-1-C of
the city's Code because they contain advertising, a feature that ap-
parently also places ordinary newspapers within the same cate-
gory.[1 51 Separate provisions in the code specifically authorize the
191. Id. at 467 n.4. "An analogous practice, deciding on content-based grounds which
beliefs merit classification as 'religion' protected by the establishment and free exercise
clauses of the First Amendment, has been severely limited by courts to avoid impermissible
government interference into protected activity." Id. (citing United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)).
192. The First Amendment Lives, supra note 176.
193. See id.
The Court's opinion can have wide ranging effects. First Amendment protec-
tion for advertising is assuming even greater importance at this time, as we see a
new Administration taking a more active stance in the lives of our citizenry.
Greater regulation in areas of health care, tobacco, alcohol, and nutrition, as well
as the environment, can be expected. Clearly, government will be more proactive
than it has been under the last two Presidents.
Id.
194. "Words of an opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1072 (6th ed. 1990).
195. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1511. The Sixth Circuit made essentially the same point.
[I1t should be noted that the ordinance can also be applied to "newspapers." All
newspapers advertise products for sale, or direct attention to business establish-
ments for the purpose of directly or indirectly promoting the sales thereof (res-
taurant or theater reviews), or direct attention to events of any kind for which an
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distribution of "newspapers" -on the public right of way, but that
term is not defined. Presumably, respondents' publications do not
qualify as newspapers because an examination of their content dis-
closes a higher ratio of advertising to other text, such as news and
feature stories, than is found in the exempted publications. Indeed,
Cincinnati's City Manager has determined that publications that
qualify as newspapers and therefore can be distributed by newsrack
are those that are published daily and or weekly and "primarily
presen[t] coverage of, and commentary on, current events."
... [I]mportant commercial attributes of various forms of com-
munication do not qualify their entitlement to constitutional protec-
tion. Thus, in, Vi ginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,[ 9% we explained:
We begin with several propositions that already are settled or
beyond serious dispute. It is clear, for example, that speech does
not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spert tq
project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another.i 971
Speech likewise is protected even though it is carried in a form that
admission fee is charged for the purpose of private profit (Reds or Bengals
games).
Discovery, 946 F.2d at 468 n.6.
196. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1512 (citing Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)). In Virginia Pharmacy-"a paradigm case of com-
mercial speech," in which "the invalidation of the restrictive statute therefore was all the
more telling," Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979) (footnote omitted)-the
Court held constitutional a Virginia statute making it unprofessional conduct for a licensed
pharmacist to advertise prescription-drug prices. "[T]he consumer's interest in the free
flow of commercial information," the Court found, "may be as keen, if not keener by far,
than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
763.
But see Jackson & Jeffries, supra. The case "was decided wrongly. In our view, the
First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and press protects only certain identifi-
able values." Id. at 5. "The role of price advertising in ordering the marketplace does not
bring it within the political speech principle of the First Amendment." Id. at 18.
197. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1512 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35-59 (1976),
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973),
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)).
In Buckley the Court held unconstitutional three of the four provisions of the Federal
Election Campaign Act involving limits to varying degrees on different kinds of financial
contributions to specific candidates for federal office that were challenged on First Amend-
ment. free speech grounds. 424 U.S. at 143,
In Pittsburgh Press the Court held constitutional a Pittsburgh ordinance prohibiting a
newspaper from publishing sex-specific help-wanted advertisements. 413 U.S. at 391. "[A]
newspaper's editorial judgments in connection with an advertisement take on the character
of the advertisement and, in those cases, the scope of the newspaper's First Amendment
protection may be affected by the content of the advertisement," the Court found. Id. at
386. "Similarly, a commercial advertisement remains commercial in the hands of the me-
dia, at least under some circumstances." Id. at 386-87 (footnote omitted).
And in the seminal New York Times the Court held, inter alia, that the First Amend-
ment, free speech considerations are the same regarding alleged libel in advertisements
published by a newspaper. See ANTHoNv LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2-3 (1991). (reproducing allegedly libelous newspaper adver-
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is 'sold' for profit[198] and even though it may involve ; solicitation
to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute money.t1991
tisement at issue)-and in the actual editorial columns of a newspaper itself. 376 U.S. at
265-66. But see Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 196, at 15.
The typical newspaper advertisement or television commercial'makes no com-
ment on governmental personnel or policy. It does not marshal information rele-
vant to political action, nor does it focus public attention on questions of political
significance. Indeed, ordinary commercial advertising is generally so bland as to
be irrelevant even to those antecedent questions of value or attitude that may
underlie political opinion.
Id. (footnote omitted). Contra R. H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J.L. STUD. 1, 8-
9 (1977). "Advertising... is clearly part of the market for ideas. Intellectuals have not, in
general welcomed this other occupant of their domain." Id.
198. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1512 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959),
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952), Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 111 (1943)).
In Smith the Court held unconstitutional a Los Angeles ordinance imposing strict
criminal liability-dispensing with a scienter (or, knowledge) requirement-for possession
of obscene material in the face of a First Amendment, free speech challenge to the ordi-
nance by a bookseller. 361 U.S. at 152-55. "It is of course no matter," the Court noted in
so doing, "that the dissemination takes place under commercial auspices." Id. at 150 (cita-
tions omitted).
In Joseph Burstyn the Court held unconstitutional, in the face of a First Amendment
free speech challenge by a motion-picture distributor, a New York state statute authorizing
the state university's board of regents (through the head of the university education de-
partment's motion-picture division) to allow only those films determined to be not "sacrile-
gious" to be licensed for public exhibition. 343 U.S. at 506. "That books, newspapers, and
magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of
expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment," the Court noted. ld. at
501-02 (footnote omitted). "We fail to see why operation for profit should have any differ-
ent effect in the case of motion pictures." Id. at 502.
And in Murdock the Court held unconstitutional a municipal ordinance- requiring
those selling "goods, paintings, pictures, wares, or merchandise of any kind" to obtain a
license for a fee in the face of a challenge to it by several Jehovah's Witnesses who distrib-
uted literature to some who had made a very small "contribution" in return therefore. 319
U.S. at 106-08, 116-17. "[T]he problem of drawing the line between a purely commercial
activity and a religious one will at times by difficult," the Court noted. Id. at 111. "On this
record it plainly cannot be said that petitioners were engaged in a commercial rather than
religious venture." Id. "It should be remembered," the Court also noted, "that the pam-
phlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge." Id.
199. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1512 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963), Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417
(1943), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940)).
In Button the Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute outlawing, inter alia, the
"'solicitation of legal business in the form of 'running' or 'capping,"' including "in the defi-
nition of 'runner' or 'capper,' an agent for an individual or organization which retains a
lawyer in connection with an action to which it is not a party and in which it has no pecuni-
ary right or liability," 371 U.S. at 423 (footnote omitted), in the face of a First Amendment,
free speech challenge to it by lawyers for the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP). Id. at 417.
In Jamison the Court held unconstitutional a Dallas ordinance prohibiting the distri-
bution of handbills on city streets in the face of a challenge to it by a Jehovah's Witness
who was convicted of distributing a handbill that included on one side of it a request for a
very small "contribution" in return for further available literature. 318 U.S. at 414. "The
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:633
If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First
Amendment protection, therefore it must be distinguished by its
content. Yet the speech whose content deprives it of protection
cannot simply be speech on .cojnmercial subject. No one would
contend that our pharmacist 200 1 may be prevented from being
heard on the subject of whether, in general, pharmaceutical prices
should be regulated, or their advertisements forbidden. Nor can it
be dispositive that a commercial advertisement is noneditorial, and
merely reports a fact, lPurely factual matter[s] of public interest
may claim protection.1201]
states can prohibit the use of the streets for the distribution of purely commercial leaflets,
even though such leaflets may have 'a civic appeal, or a moral platitude' appended," the
Court found. Id. 318 U.S. at 417 (quoting Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55
(1941)).
They may not prohibit the distribution of handbills in the pursuit of a clearly
religious activity merely because the handbills invite the purchase of books for
the improved understanding of the religion or because the handbills seek in a
lawful fashion to promote the raising of funds for religious purposes.
Id.
And in Cantwell the Court set aside convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses under a similar
Connecticut statute. 310 U.S. 296.
200. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1512. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
201. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1512 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975),
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
In Bigelow the Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute making it a misdemeanor
to encourage or prompt the procuring of an abortion by the sale or circulation of any
particular publication in the face of a First Amendment, free speech challenge to it by the
editor of a weekly newspaper serving the locale encompassing the University of Virginia
that had published just such an advertisement. 421 U.S. at 811-12, 829. The Court found
that
[t]he legitimacy of appellant's First Amendment claim in the present case is
demonstrated by the important differences between the advertisement presently
at issue and those involved in Chrestensen and Pittsburgh Press. The advertise-
ment published in appellant's newspaper did more than simply propose a com-
mercial transaction. It contained factual material of clear "public interest."
Portions of its message, most prominently the lines, "Abortions are now legal in
New York. There are no residency requirements," involve the exercise of the
freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion.
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential
interest and value to a diverse audience-not only to readers possibly in need of
the services offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine
interest in, the subject matter or the law of another State and its development,
and to readers seeking reform in Virginia.
We conclude ... that the Virginia courts erred in their assumptions that ad-
vertising, as such, was entitled to no First Amendment protection and that appel-
lant Bigelow had no legitimate First Amendment interest. We need not decide in
this case the precise extent to which the First Amendment permits regulation of
advertising that is related to activities the State may legitimately regulate or even
prohibit.
Advertising, like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable regula-
tion that serves a legitimate public interest. To the extent that commercial activ-
ity is subject to regulation, the relationship of speech to that activity may be one
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We then held that even speech that does no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction is protected by the First Amendment.2 °2
In later opinions we have stated that speech proposing a commer-
cial transaction is entitled to lesser protection than other constitution-
ally guaranteed expression.[203] We have also suggested that such
lesser protection was appropriate for a somewhat larger category of
commercial speech-"that is, expression related solely to the eco-
nomic interests of the speaker and its audience."1[2041 We did not, how-
factor, among others, to be considered in weighing the First Amendment interest
against the governmental interest alleged. Advertising is not thereby stripped of
all First Amendment protection. The relationship of speech to the marketplace of
products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.
Id. at 821-22, 825-26 (citations and footnotes omitted).
And in Thornhill the Court held unconstitutional an Alabama statute forbidding cer-
tain loitering and picketing in the face of a First Amendment, free speech challenge to it by
a union member on strike who was (peacefully) picketing the company for which he had
been working and against which his union had taken the action. 310 U.S. 88.
202. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1512 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
203. Id. at 1513 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
In Ohralik the Court held constitutional an Ohio State Bar Association disciplinary rule
prohibiting the in-person solicitation of clients for pecuniary gain against a First Amend-
ment, free speech challenge to it by an attorney who had been disciplined under the rule
for personally soliciting accident victims, proposing that he represent them on a contin-
gency-fee basis in legal actions arising out thereof. 436 U.S. at 449-54. "[Iln-person solici-
tation of professional employment by a lawyer," the Court found,
does not stand on a par with truthful advertising about the availability and terms
of routine legal services, let alone with forms of speech more traditionally within
the concerns of the First Amendment.
Expression concerning purely commercial transactions has come within the
ambit of the Amendment's protection only recently. In rejecting the notion that
such speech "is wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment," ... we
were careful not to hold "that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms" of
speech. We have not discarded the "common-sense" distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject
to government regulation, and other varieties of speech. To require a parity of
constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could
invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First
Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial
speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate posi-
tion in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation
that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.
[.. T]he state does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity ...
whenever speech is a component of that activity.
Id. at 455-56 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771) (citations and footnote omitted).
204. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1513 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elecs. Corp. v. Pub-
lic Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)). See supra note 157.
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ever, use that definition in either Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products[°51
or in Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox.[2°6]
In the Bolger case we held that a federal statute prohibiting the
mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives could not be
applied to the appellee's promotional materials. Most of the appel-
lee's mailings consisted primarily of price and quantity information,
and thus fell "within the core notion of commercial speech-'speech
which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction." 119[2071
Relying in part on the appellee's economic motivation, the Court also
answered the "closer question" about the proper label for informa-
tional pamphlets that were concededly advertisements referring to a
specific product, and concluded that they also were "commercial
speech.120811 It is noteworthy that in reaching that conclusion "we did
not simply apply the broader definition of commercial speech ad-
vanced in Central Hudson-a definition that obviously would have en-
compassed the mailings-but rather examined [them] carefully to
ensure that speech deserving of greater constitutional protection is not
inadvertently suppressed. '[209I In Fox, we described the category even
more narrowly, by characterizing the proposal of a commercial trans-
action as "the test for identifying commercial speech. ' [2111
Under the Fox test it is clear that much of the material in ordi-
nary newspapers is commercial speech and, conversely, that the edito-
rial content in respondents' promotional publications is not what we
have described as "core" commercial speech. There is no doubt a
"common sense" basis for distinguishing between the two, but under
both the city's Code and our cases the difference is a matter of
degree.2n
205. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1513 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60
(1983)).
206. Id. (citing Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989)).
See supra note 167.
207. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1513 (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 (quoting Virginia Phar-
macy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)))).
208. Id. (quoting Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67).
209. Id. (quoting Bolger, 463 U.S. at 63) (alteration in Discovery).
210. Id (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis in Discovery only)).
211. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1511-13 (footnotes omitted).
Cf Moser v. F.C.C., 826 F. Supp. 360, 364-66 (D. Ore. 1993). Moser held unconstitu-
tional the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which prohibited the use of an
artificial or pre-recorded voice to deliver commercial-but not "nonprofit"-messages to a
residential telephone without the resident's consent. Id.
There is no ... justification presented ... in the bald assertion that banning
commercial solicitations but not nonprofit solicitations furthers the protection of
residential tranquility. Both kinds of telemarketing calls trigger the same ring of
1995]
No, no blockhead Justice Stevens either.
C. Applying Justice Stevens' "Matter-of-Degree" Dicta in Discovery
In his extended Discovery dicta, Justice Stevens draws no distinc-
tion at all (in terms of either 1) the strength of the asserted govern-
mental interest necessary for it to overcome a plaintiff's First
Amendment, free speech claim or 2) the degree to which the infringe-
ment directly and reasonably advances that interest)212 between ad-
vertising as a form of commercial speech (here, the "commercial
handbills") and any other form of commercial speech (here, in this
dicta portion of the opinion, the actual, "for-sale," "newspaper" prod-
uct). 21 1 Stevens' dicta, in fact, directly disdains, downplays, and dis-
courages any such distinctions. In theory, literally-except, perhaps,
regarding the Tenth Circuit's pending Cardtoons-it allows us to
briefly examine a potential path to a more-balanced, constitutional
and common law vindication of parody (of celebrities, in commercial
speech), parity (between advertising and other types of commercial
speech), and (the property right of) publicity.
1. To a Theoretically Fully Appealed Coors
Applied to the facts of a theoretically fully appealed Coors,214
Justice Stevens' above-quoted, extended dicta in Discovery would
seem to yield a conclusion that both the advertising-restricting portion
of the FAAA and the portion restricting the content includable on the
labels of such alcoholic beverage products themselves are unconstitu-
tional restrictions on the First Amendment, free speech protection to
be accorded any type of commercial speech, again making absolutely
no distinction at all between advertising as a form of such speech and
the telephone; both kinds of calls invade the home equally, and both risk inter-
rupting the recipient's privacy equally.
Id. at 366.
212. This approach is similar to Judge Weinshienk's initial, 1990 grant of summary judg-
ment in Coors and to Chief Judge Ellison's initial, 1993 adoption of the magistrate judge's
report and recommendation in Cardtoons. However, Justice Souter's opinion differs with
respect to Judge Weinshienk's unappealed, pre-Discovery reasoning in Coors on remand
from the Tenth Circuit regarding that portion of the FAAA restricting promotional adver-
tising then still at issue, and Chief Judge Ellison's distinction between Samsung's parodic
advertisement at issue in White and the actual, "for-sale," parodic, trading-card products at
issue in his post-Campbell Cardtoons reconsideration, now pending on appeal to that same
Tenth Circuit.
213. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1511-13.
214. One in which Coors would have appealed District Court Judge Weinshienk's deci-
sion on remand that the portion of the FAAA restricting the content includable in promo-
tional advertising for the actual, "for-sale," alcoholic beverage products themselves was
constitutional. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
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other forms. Just as "much of the material in ordinary newspapers is
commercial speech," '215 according to Justice Stevens in Discovery, cer-
tainly much of the material on ordinary beer cans is also such com-
mercial speech. "Conversely," as he also found in Discovery, just as
much of "the editorial content in respondents' promotional publica-
tions is not what we have described as 'core' commercial speech," '216
certainly much (if not almost all) of the material in current promo-
tional advertisements, including those for both alcoholic beverage
products generally and Coors' specifically, is not "core" commercial
speech. As in Discovery, while there "is no doubt a 'common sense'
basis for distinguishing between the two ... the difference is a matter
of degree" '217 and not of kind.
2. To the Cardtoons Reconsideration and Its Actual Parody Exception
Applied to Chief District Judge Ellison's Cardtoons reconsidera-
tion,218 Justice Stevens' above-quoted, extended dicta in Discovery
would seem to direct the Tenth Circuit to: 1) shun Chief Judge Elli-
son's distinction between a) Samsung's parodic television advertise-
ments as a form of commercial speech at issue in White,219 and b) the
actual, "for-sale," parodic, trading-card products as a form of such
speech at issue in Cardtoons;22 0 and, thus, 2) to mold a parody excep-
tion in which the equivalent to fair use's first factor will not hereafter
be considered to necessarily weigh against any future parodic advertis-
ers seeking to assert the First Amendment, free speech protection
simply because they are advertisers. Again, just as 'much of the ma-
terial in ordinary newspapers is commercial speech, '22 1 certainly
much of the material on Cardtoons' parodic trading cards is also such
commercial speech. Again, "[c]onversely," as he also found in Dis-
covery, just as much of "the editorial content in respondents' promo-
tional publications is not what we have described as .'core' commercial
speech. ' 222 Certainly, much (yet again, lately, if not almost all) of the
material in promotional advertisements, including those for both
215. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1513.
216. Id. 'Core' commercial speech is that "speech which does 'no more than propose a
commercial transaction."' Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 63
(1983); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
217. Id.
218. See supra part III.
219. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
221. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1513.
222. Id.
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home-electronics products generally and Samsung's VCRs specifi-
cally,223 is not "core" commercial speech, doing "no more than pro-
pos[ing] a commercial transaction." As in Discovery, "the difference
is a matter of degree, '224 and not of kind. It should not matter, in
other words, that the "ad's spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of For-
tune is subservient and only tangentially related to the ad's primary
message: 'buy Samsung VCRs.' ' 225
3. To White with a Theoretical Parody Exception
Applied to the facts of White,226 with a theoretical parody excep-
tion to the common law right of publicity emulating federal statutory
copyright law's four-factor, fair use exception, Justice Stevens' above-
quoted dicta in Discovery227 yields a similar conclusion: 1) Samsung's
parodic television advertisement as a form of commercial speech
should not have been lazily and peremptorily distinguished from any
other form of such speech just because it was an advertisement, and
thus, 2) that the equivalent to fair use's first factor would not necessar-
ily weigh against the Samsung parody of White simply because it ap-
peared in an advertisement. Yet again, as Justice Stevens found in
Discovery, just as much of "the editorial content in respondents' pro-
motional publications is not what we have described as 'core' com-
mercial speech."22 Certainly, much (yet again, lately, if not almost
all) of the material in promotional advertisements, including those for
both home-electronics products generally and Samsung's VCRs spe-
cifically,2 29 is not "core" commercial speech. As in Discovery, the dif-
ference between parodic promotional advertising as a form of
commercial and other forms of protected, parodic commercial speech
"is a matter of degree." 230
It would have-finally, yet again-mattered not, in other words,
that the "ad's spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune is sub-
servient and only tangentially related to the ad's primary message:
'buy Samsung VCRs,"' 231 in the (above-quoted, now several times)
words of Senior Judge Goodwin's distinction in White between: 1)
223. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
224. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1513.
225. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. 1266, 1272 (N.D.
Okla. 1994) (quoting White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir.
1992)). See supra text accompanying notes 45, 140.
226. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 195-211 and accompanying text.
228. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1513.
229. See supra notes 28-29, 227 and accompanying text.
230. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. at 1513.
231. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Samsung's parodic advertisements at issue therein; and, 2) both, a) the
"advertisement" parody of the Reverend Falwell in actual, "for-sale,"
Hustler-magazine products at issue in Hustler,232 and, b) the actual,
"for-sale," parodic, "L.L. Bean-catalog" products at issue in L.L.
Bean.233 Circuit Judge Alarcon's observation in dissent that "the de-
fendants in those cases were making fun of the Reverend Jerry Falwell
and L.L. Bean for the purely commercial purpose of selling soft-core
pornographic magazines '234 would have perhaps carried the day, and
maybe more of the early legal commentary's reaction to White235
would have been a little less hostile.
This application does not necessarily mean that the outcome of
White would have been any different, of course. As Judge Ellison cor-
rectly noted in his Cardtoons reconsideration's internal reconsidera-
tion of Original Appalachian Artworks, Campbell merely "demot[ed]
'commercial purpose' from its misperceived status as a determinative
factor to that of one among several factors; '236 the common law
equivalent to the fair use exception's other three factors would also
have had to be taken into account. White, in this light, might still have
been rightly decided, but just for the wrong reasons.
V
Conclusion
No, no blockhead Justice Stevens-who, of course, did not need
to add the extended dicta to Discovery. He could have done so,
though, for any of several good reasons-including providing gui-
dance to lower courts like the Tenth Circuit considering cases with
facts like those in Cardtoons.
Or, being no blockhead, maybe even just for money.
232. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
234. White, 971 F.2d at 1407 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Compare Pemberton, supra note
26, at 127.
235. See supra part I.A.2.
236. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. 1266, 1272 (N.D.
Okla. 1994).
1995] PARODY, PARITY, AND PUBLICITY
690 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:633
1995] PARODY, PARITY, AND PUBLICITY
APPENDIX A:
Vanna White, Samsung's Robot, and Other Samsung
Advertisements
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e+ you'll tape it on. 2012 A.D.
In the next century, will "she" still be America's favorite gameshow
hostess? You'll have to wait for the answer. But we can tell you
about prize VCR's for today and tomorrow: Samsung. Take a look at
Samsung's full-featured, high-quality line. And you'll see why
Samsung is heading into the future at fast forward. Samsung. The
future of electronics.
Reproduced with the permission of John Genga, Esq.
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APPENDIX B:
Selected "Cardtoons"
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